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SUMMARY
With the increase in the complexity of computer systems, existing security
measures are not enough to prevent attacks. Intrusion detection systems have become
an integral part of computer security to detect attempted intrusions. Intrusion detec-
tion systems need to be fast in order to detect intrusions in real time. Furthermore,
intrusion detection systems need to be robust against the attacks which are disguised
to evade them.
We improve the runtime complexity and space requirements of a host-based anomaly
detection system that uses q-gram matching. q-gram matching is often used for ap-
proximate substring matching problems in a wide range of application areas, including
intrusion detection. During the text pre-processing phase, we store all the q-grams
present in the text in a tree. We use a tree redundancy pruning algorithm to reduce
the size of the tree without losing any information. We also use suffix links for fast
linear-time q-gram search during query matching. We compare our work with the
Rabin-Karp based hash-table technique, commonly used for multiple q-gram match-
ing.
To analyze the robustness of network anomaly detection systems, we develop a
new class of polymorphic attacks called polymorphic blending attacks, that can effec-
tively evade payload-based network anomaly IDSs by carefully matching the statistics
of the mutated attack instances to the normal profile. Using PAYL anomaly detection
system for our case study, we show that these attacks are practically feasible. We
develop a formal framework which is used to analyze polymorphic blending attacks
for several network anomaly detection systems. We show that generating an opti-
mal polymorphic blending attack is NP-hard for these anomaly detection systems.
xii
However, we can generate polymorphic blending attacks using the proposed approxi-
mation algorithms. The framework can also be used to improve the robustness of an
intrusion detector. We suggest some possible countermeasures one can take to im-





Security of computer systems has become a major concern with critical societal infras-
tructures relying on computers. Considering the complexity of the softwares deployed
in network system, intrusion prevention measures like firewalls and cryptographic pro-
tocols are deemed insufficient in ensuring the security of the system. Multiple layers
of security is required to avoid attacks on the system and to detect possible attacks on
the system. Intrusion detection system (IDS) has become an integral part of computer
security infrastructure. IDS monitors computers or networks for unauthorized access
or activity. IDS detects an attempted, failed or successful intrusion on the system.
An IDS can be classified based on the input data or the detection mechanism.
Depending on the data used by an IDS, the IDS can be classified into a network
IDS or host-based IDS.
• Network IDS: A network IDS analyzes the data transmitted over a network. A
network IDS can protect a big network, a LAN, or a single host. Data used by
a network IDS includes, packet header data, packet statistics, and application
layer payload data. Various network statistics such as rate of incoming pack-
ets, rate of failed connections, and average session length can also be used for
detection purposes.
• Host-based IDS: A host-based IDS is deployed on the host machine to be pro-
tected. Various host-related data like commands executed, cpu usage, hard-disk
access, memory usage, audit logs and others can be used by a host-based IDS
to detect an intrusion. Sequence of system calls executed by a program can also
be used for the detection of an intrusion.
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Based on the detection mechanism, an IDS can be classified into a misuse IDS or
an anomaly IDS.
• Misuse IDS (or Signature IDS): A misuse detector uses known patterns of at-
tacks called signatures to catch intrusions. A misuse IDS generates signatures
from a given set of attacks. While monitoring, it checks if an attack pattern is
present in the monitored data and takes appropriate action when a signature is
matched. Hence, misuse IDSs can only detect known attacks.
• Anomaly IDS: An anomaly detector records the normal usage patterns of the
system. Any system usage which deviates significantly from the normal profile
is considered a possible intrusion and an alarm is raised. Unlike a misuse IDS,
an anomaly IDS does not require knowledge of attack patterns and thus can
possibly detect new attacks.
The two main requirements of an intrusion detector are efficiency and accuracy.
In case of an active attacker who is trying to avoid detection, robustness of the IDS is
a more practical measure than accuracy. In this dissertation, we analyse and improve
on both efficiency and robustness of anomaly detection systems.
1.1 Efficiency
An efficient IDS should be fast and should require less memory. This is essential
to detect an attack as early as possible. This is also required so that the IDS can
be deployed on a high speed network or a heavily loaded server without significant
resource overheads. Misuse IDS and anomaly IDS rely on matching monitored data
with attack patterns and normal patterns to detect intrusions. One of the main factors
affecting the speed of an intrusion detector is the speed of the matching algorithm it
uses. Also, the memory requirement of an IDS is dependent on the space needed to
store the patterns used for matching. Thus, it is crucial that the matching algorithm
be fast and require minimal memory.
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The substring matching problem presented in this dissertation is motivated by a
host-based anomaly detection system proposed by Forrest et al. [19]. Normal behav-
ior of a program is observed via its interaction with the underlying operating system,
which can be characterized by the sequence of system calls generated by the pro-
gram. Forrest et al. observed that small sequences of system calls are very consistent
throughout different normal executions of a program. We can build a normal profile of
a program using the substrings of the system call sequences generated by the sample
executions of the program. While monitoring, we can observe the substrings of the
system calls generated by the program and check if they match the stored substrings.
If a substring does not have a match, an alarm is raised.
The above anomaly detection system requires matching constant-length substrings
(called q-grams) present in the observed program and the normal database. The above
substring matching problem is called q-gram matching. q-gram matching has been
used extensively in many application areas including information retrieval, signal pro-
cessing, pattern recognition, and computational biology. In computational biology,
genomic sequences show high level of matching for small length substrings. In in-
formation retrieval, filtration-based approximate string matching algorithms require
efficient search of all the q-grams shared by query and text. In some word processors,
q-gram matching is performed for approximate matching and finding misspellings.
q-gram matching is also used in signal processing for approximate matching.
An anomaly detection system uses a huge set of training normal patterns to avoid
false positives. For a huge pattern size, current q-gram matching algorithms become
unacceptable. In Section 3, we present a tree-based model for an efficient q-gram




The accuracy of an IDS is decided using its false positive rate and true positive (also
called true detection) rate. The false positive rate is the fraction of normal data which
is incorrectly labeled by an IDS as an attack. True positive rate is the fraction of
attack data, successfully detected by an IDS. Ideally, an IDS should detect all the
attacks and label all the normal packets as normal. Thus, for an ideal IDS, false
positive rate is 0 and true positive rate is 1. Practically, an IDS is said to be accurate
if it detects most of the attacks while incorrectly labeling very few normal activities
as attacks. That is, an accurate IDS should have a very low false positive rate and a
high true positive rate.
Although useful, these two metrics are not sufficient to evaluate an IDS. The false
positive rate and the true positive rate are calculated using a test set containing
normal data and attack data. In the face of a sophisticated attacker who actively
tries to evade the IDS, the IDS may produce much higher false positives or may
have much lower true positive rate. For example, in case of an anomaly detection
system, an attacker can intelligently craft an attack that is very similar to the normal
pattern. The IDS will not be able to detect this attack. These type of attacks are
called mimicry attacks.
Mimicry attacks have been proposed for host-anomaly detection systems. But no
mimicry attacks have been designed for network anomaly IDSs. We present a novel
polymorphic attack, called Polymorphic Blending Attack, to analyse the robustness
of network anomaly IDSs. We show that these attacks are practical for a wide range
of network anomaly IDSs. We developed a framework that can be used to analyse the
complexity of generating polymorphic blending attacks. We also propose algorithms
to automatically generate polymorphic blending attacks. The framework can also be




2.1 String Matching Algorithms
The problem of substring matching has been studied extensively by researchers in sev-
eral fields. Initial research was mainly focused on complete string matching, required
for keyword search in a database. But later the focus shifted to substring matching
and approximate string matching. In approximate string matching, a query matches
a text with at most k-mismatches.
Suffix trees are used extensively for different string processing problems. A suffix
tree can be used for linear time search of a single string in a text. Various algorithms
were suggested by Weiner [73], McCreight [37], and Ukkonen [63] for efficient suffix
tree generation. Chen and Seiferas [7] proposed a simple technique to efficiently
generate a tree to store all the sub-words of a word.
Knuth-Morris-Pratt (KMP) [26] proposed a string searching algorithm. The algo-
rithm preprocesses the query to compute a shift function, which is used in the search
phase later. The search phase has runtime complexity of O(m + n) where n is the
length of text and m is the length of query. Boyer-Moore (BM) [4] suggested a faster
algorithm which is now widely implemented for string searching in shell commands
(grep) and some editors. The query preprocessing phase of the BM algorithm is of
O(m) complexity and the matching phase has the worst case of O(mn) time com-
plexity. But for English text, the average runtime complexity of the BM algorithm
is much smaller than the worst case, and is around three times better than the KMP
algorithm. Sunday [55] improved on the BM algorithm by improving the BM’s shift
function and adding a similar shift function used in the KMP algorithm. Sunday’s
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algorithm has the worst case of O(m + n), and its expected runtime is smaller than
the BM algorithm.
String matching algorithm with multiple texts was proposed by Aho-Corasick
(AC) [1]. The AC algorithm preprocesses the texts to create a deterministic finite
automaton (DFA), which is similar to Trie structure. The algorithm reads the succes-
sive characters in the query and makes state transitions based on the next character
in the query. The algorithm takes linear time to the length of the query. Coit et
al. [10] proposed a fast string matching algorithm, the AC BM algorithm, for intru-
sion detection. The algorithm stores the texts in a tree similar to Aho-Corasick. Its
matching process uses techniques similar to Boyer-Moore.
The above algorithms are based on Boyer-Moore and work well for large queries
with a small character size (σ). They do not perform very well for large character
sizes or huge texts.
Approximate string matching [38] has also been studied extensively. Landau and
Vishkin [33] proposed an O(kn + km log m) approximate string matching algorithm
where k is the number of allowed mismatches. The Lanadu-Vishkin algorithm was
improved by the Galil-Ginacarlo algorithm [21], which has O(kn + m log m) time
complexity. Tarhio and Ukkonen [59] proposed a Boyer-Moore algorithm based
approach for approximate string matching. Cole and Hariharan [11] presented an
O(n(1 + k3/m)) algorithm based on dynamic programming. Wu et al. [75] used DFA
for approximate matching in O(mn/ log s) where s is the number of states in DFA.
No approximate string matching algorithm is known to have a worst case complexity
less than O(kn).
A lot of work has been done on filtration based approximate string matching.
Filtration based algorithms first choose a set of positions in the text which are poten-
tially similar to the pattern. Then each pre-selected position is verified for a match
using an accurate string matching technique. Karp and Rabin [24] first described a
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filtration based approach for exact string matching. Navarro and Baeza-Yates ([39],
[40]) proposed an O(kn logσ m/σ) approximate string matching algorithm by improv-
ing on the idea developed by Wu and Manber [74]. Later, q-gram based filtration
algorithms ([62], [6], [56]) were developed for approximate matching. q-gram filtra-
tion approach is based on observation that if a pattern approximately matches a
substring of the text, then they share a certain number of q-grams for sufficiently
large q. Finding all q-grams shared by the pattern and the text is done by hash-
ing. The algorithm proposed in our paper can be used to find all q-grams efficiently.
Chang and Marr [6] proposed filtering based algorithm with an average complexity
of O(n(k+logσ m)
m
). Furthermore, they proved that this is a lower bound on the average
complexity. In practice, filtration based string matching algorithms are the fastest,
but their applicability is limited by the error level.
The Rabin-Karp algorithm [24] searches for a substring within a text by hashing.
It is suitable for searching multiple patterns of the same length in the text. Suppose
we are matching patterns of length q in a text T. First, we compute the hashes of
the text patterns and store them in a hash-table. Next we compute and match the
hashes of all substrings of the query with the hashes of the text patterns. If two
hashes match, then there is a very high probability that the two substrings match.
To be completely sure, one can perform a naive matching on the two substrings. In
case the hashes do not match, then we can say for sure that the substrings do not
match. The main idea of Rabin-Karp is to efficiently compute hashes of successive
substrings in constant time by using the hash of the previous substring. Using such
a hashing function, matching can be done in expected time of O(m).
QUASAR, proposed by Burkhardt et al. [5], finds all the substrings in a text which
has a maximum of k mismatching q-grams as in query. QUASAR uses a suffix array
to retrieve the positions of any given q-gram in the text. Searching of a given q-gram
is done using a hash-table. The preprocessing phase of QUASAR takes O(n log n)
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time. The matching of a query string takes O(nm) time. The space complexity of
the matching algorithm is O(5n + qS), where S is the number of unique q-grams in
text. The high complexity of QUASAR is because it tries to find all the positions in
the text that have a possible matching alignment with the query string.
All of the above string matching algorithms are not suitable for multiple q-gram
matching. The best known string matching algorithm takes O(n logσ m
m
) expected time.
When applied to multiple q-gram matching, the algorithms have an average complex-
ity of O(n logσ q
q
m). This is not acceptable for situations where text size is huge. When
applied to q-gram matching problem, Aho-Corasick algorithm takes O(qm) time. The
Rabin-Karp algorithm works in linear time of the query size but needs lot of space to
store the hash-table. Furthermore, it needs to create separate hash-tables for different
values of q.
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Transforming attack packets to avoid detection is a common practice among attack-
ers. Attackers can exploit the ambiguities present in the traffic stream to transform
an attack instance to another so that an IDS is not able to recognize the attack pat-
tern. IP and TCP transformations ([23, 44]) techniques are used to evade NIDS that
analyzes TCP/IP headers. Vigna et al. [66] discussed multiple network, application
and exploit layer (shellcode polymorphism) mutation mechanisms. A formal model
to combine multiple transformations was presented by Rubin et al. [48]. Multiple
tools such as Fragroute [54], Whisker [45], and AGENT [48] are available that can
perform attack mutation.
Code polymorphism has been used extensively by virus writers to write polymor-
phic viruses. Mistfall, tPE, EXPO, and DINA [57, 76] are some of the polymor-
phic engines used by virus writers. Worm writers have also started using polymor-
phic engines. ADMmutate [32], PHATBOT [22], and JempiScodes [50] are some of
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the polymorphic shellcode generators commonly used to write polymorphic worms.
Garbage and NOP insertions, register shuffling, equivalent code substitution, and en-
cryption/decryption are some of the common techniques used to write polymorphic
shellcodes.
Numerous approaches have been proposed to detect polymorphic attacks. In [61],
Toth et al. proposed a technique to locate the presence of executable shellcode inside
the payload. They used abstract execution of network flows to find the MEL (Max-
imum Executable Length) of the payload. The flow is marked suspicious if its MEL
is above certain length. Chinchani et al. [8] performed fast static analysis to check if
a network flow contains exploit code. STRIDE [2] focuses on detecting polymorphic
sleds used by buffer overflow attacks. In [29], Kruegel et al. used structural analysis
of binary code to find similarities between different worm instances. Using a graph
coloring technique on a worm’s control flow graph, this approach is able to accurately
model the structure of the worm. Given a set of suspicious flows, Polygraph [41]
generates a set of disjoint invariant substrings that are present in multiple suspicious
flows. These substrings can then be used as a signature to detect worm instances. In
a recent work, Perdisci et al. [42] proposed an attack on Polygraph [41] where noise is
injected into the dataset of suspicious flows so that Polygraph is not able to generate
a reliable signature for the worm. Shield [69] uses transport layer filters to block
the traffic that exploits a known vulnerability. Filters are exploit-independent, and
vulnerabilities are described as a partial state machines of the vulnerable application.
In [9], Christodorescu et al. proposed an instruction semantics based worm detection
technique. The proposed approach can detect code polymorphism that uses instruc-
tion reordering, register shuffling, and garbage insertions. It is worth noting that
unless the attacker combines the polymorphic blending attack proposed in this paper
with other evasion techniques, the approaches cited above [2, 8, 9, 29, 41, 61, 69] may
be able to detect the attack.
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Several attack specification languages have been developed by researchers to repre-
sent the attack signatures efficiently and dis-ambiguously. NETSTAT [15] represents
the attack events using a state based machine called STATL. Snort [46] represents
a signature using regular expressions consisting network bytes. It also uses other
packet attributes. Liang et al. [34] presented extended FSA based attack signatures.
GARD [47] is a tool for regular language based generation of attack instances. It is
observed that many of the proposed signatures are based on regular grammar or state
machine.
A number of attacks aimed at evading Host-based anomaly IDS have been devel-
oped. Wagner et al. [68] and Tan et al. [58] presented mimicry attacks against the stide
model [20] developed by Forrest et al. The main idea behind these mimicry attacks
was to inject dummy system calls into an attack sequence to make the final system
call sequence look similar to the normal system call sequence. As a defense against
mimicry attacks as well as other impossible path attacks [17, 67], more advanced de-
tection approaches (e.g., [16, 17]) were proposed, which use call stack information
along with the system call sequences. Recently, a more sophisticated mimicry attack
was proposed by Kruegel et al. [28], which can evade most system call based anomaly
IDS.
Several application payload-based anomaly IDS [30, 35, 36] have been proposed
which monitor the payload of a packet for anomalies. NETAD and LERAD [35, 30]
models the first few bytes of the application layer headers of a packet using a set
of rules. In [31], Kruegel et al. proposed six different models, namely, length, char-
acter distribution, probabilistic regular grammar, token set, attribute presence, and
attribute order for detection of http attacks. They modeled different http attributes
like URL path, SQL query string, etc. Sekar et al. [51] presented an anomaly detec-
tion system based on network protocol specifications. Specification is defined using
extended finite state automaton. Statistical features based on the state transitions
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are monitored to detect anomalies.
PAYL, proposed by Wang and Stolfo [71], records the average frequency of occur-
rences of each byte in the payload of a normal packet. A separate profile is created
for each port and packet length. In their recent work [72], the authors suggested an
improved version of PAYL that computes several profiles for each port. At the end of
the training, clustering is performed to reduce the number of profiles. They proposed
that instead of byte frequency, one can also use an q-gram model in a similar fashion.
One main drawback of the system is that they do not consider an advanced attacker,
who may know the IDS running at the target and actively try to evade it. In this
paper we provide strong evidence that such byte frequency based anomaly IDS are
open to attacks and may be easily evaded.
[3] raises the doubts on the security of machine learning based IDS in the face
of a determined resourceful attacker. It discussed the possible manipulation of the
IDS training process so that the normal space of IDS is gradually moved to include
attack packets. Polymorphic blending attack takes a different approach and modifies
the attack instance to move it closer to the normal space. CLET [13], an advanced
polymorphic engine, comes closest to our polymorphic blending attack. It performs
spectrum analysis to evade IDS that use data mining methods for worm detection.
Given an attack payload, CLET adds padding bytes in a separate cramming bytes
zone (of a given length) to try and make the byte frequency distribution of the attack
close to the normal traffic. However, the encoded shellcode (using XOR) in CLET
may still deviate significantly from the normal distribution and the obtained poly-
morphic attack may be detected by the IDS. A preliminary work by Kolesnikov et al.
[27] introduced and cursorily explored polymorphic blending attacks. In this paper
we present a systematic approach for evading byte frequency-based network anomaly
IDS, and provide detailed analysis of the design, complexity and possible counter-
measures for the polymorphic blending attacks. We also show that our polymorphic
11




EFFICIENT APPROXIMATE STRING MATCHING
ALGORITHM
3.1 Introduction
Given a text string, T, and a query string, Q, the problem of q-gram matching is to
find all the substrings of length q in the query which are also present in the text. This
problem can be easily extended to multiple text strings. Since the set of normal or
attack patterns needs to be extensive, there is usually a huge number of text patterns
in intrusion detection. The length of the query is much smaller than the text.
Existing string or substring matching algorithms are not suitable for the q-gram
matching problem and do not have good runtime efficiency. The expected run-time
complexity of the best existing string matching algorithm is sub-linear to the length
of the text. They do not apply well to multiple q-gram matching with a huge text
size. Some string matching algorithms with multiple texts have complexity of the
length of the query. When used for multiple q-gram matching, they take q×m time,
where m is the length of query.
A simple solution for the problem is to record all the unique q-grams present in
the text and store them in a hash-table. While matching, we can get each of the
q-grams in the query and check if it is present in the hash-table. If the calculation
of the hash function takes time t, then the total time to match the query will be
O(mt) where m is the length of the query. The Rabin-Karp algorithm follows a
similar idea and presents an efficient method to calculate hashes. The Rabin-Karp
algorithm is the only existing algorithm that we are aware of which works well for the
given problem. We present a new q-gram matching algorithm that is more efficient
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than the Rabin-Karp algorithm. Although our work was motivated by applications
in intrusion detection, the algorithm is general and is applicable to other domains.
The solution we propose makes use of interpretability and efficiency of the tree
structure to develop a linear time algorithm for the q-gram matching problem. In the
preprocessing step, all the q-grams present in the text are extracted and stored in a
tree structure. This tree structure is similar to the Trie structure used for storing
dictionaries. We can add suffix links [37] for efficient runtime substring matching.
This tree may become very big depending on the character size, the structure of the
text, and the value of q. We also propose a tree redundancy pruning algorithm to
reduce the size of the tree. The proposed solution has the same linear time complexity
as a hash-table but with a smaller constant. It also uses less storage space than a
hash-table. In addition, our approach can be used to perform q-gram matching for
all the different values of q (1 ≤ q ≤ Max Tree Depth). A hash-table method, on the
other hand, can be used for only one value of q.
3.2 Tree Model
The tree structure provides a general framework for a systematic study of stream
data. Trees are computationally efficient for storage, addition, and searching for sets
of strings. Tree structures have been used extensively in many applications. For ex-
ample, decision tree classifiers are successfully used in areas such as character/speech
recognition, medical diagnosis, and remote sensing. Prefix trees are used to store and
search through dictionaries. Suffix trees are a widely used data structure for text
processing.
3.2.1 Notations
In the discussion that follows, we use x, y to represent arbitrary characters and X, Y
to represent arbitrary substrings. X[i, · · · , j] represents a substring of X that starts
with the ith character and ends with the jth character. T represents the provided text
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and Q stands for the query string. A substring is said to be accepted by a substring
matching algorithm if it was matched successfully. The substring is rejected if no
match was found. For any string X, its length is denoted by |X|. X[i] denotes the
ith character of string X. xX and Xx mean string X is appended with character
x at the start and at the end, respectively. T represents the tree used to store the
q-grams of the text T. Figure 1 shows an example tree to store length-4 substrings
(or 4-grams) of text 1000011011. Ts is the tree with suffix link, Tp is the tree after
pruning, and Tsp is the pruned tree with suffix link. The concepts of a pruned tree
and a suffix link will be explained in later sections. q denotes the length of the
matching substring. N(l) is the number of nodes at depth l of the tree, and NT
is the total number of nodes in the tree. Each node of the tree corresponds to a
substring present in the text. For convenience, we use the term node X[i, · · · , j] to
denote the tree node corresponding to substring X[i, · · · , j]. For example, node 13 in
the Figure 1 is referred as node T [2, · · · , 5] because it refers to substring T [2, · · · , 5]
(0000). Node X[i + 1, · · · , j] is called immediate suffix node of the node X[i, · · · , j].
Node X[i+ l, · · · , j] is called longest suffix node of the node X[i, · · · , j] if none of the
nodes X[i + l′, · · · , j], 1 ≤ l′ < l, exists in the tree. Two trees T1 and T2 are said to
be identical if, for all nodes in T1, there is a corresponding node in T2 with the same
path from the root, and vice versa. Tree T1 is similar to tree T2 if both trees are
identical until depth d where d = min(depth(T1), depth(T2)).
3.2.2 Tree Structure
A set of strings of length q can be efficiently represented using a depth q tree (T ).
A node in the tree at depth l is associated with a substring of length l. Also, a link
between a node at depth l− 1 and a node at depth l is associated with the character
at position l in the string. Figure 1 shows an example sequence and the corresponding




































Figure 1: Tree built from text 1000011011 for substrings of length 4. There
are 7 length-4 substrings (4-grams) present in the text, namely {1000, 0000,
0001, 0011, 0110, 1101, 1011}. Each leaf node corresponds to one substring in the
set.
Consider the substring matching problem with query Q[1, · · · , m]. For each sub-
string Q[i, · · · , i+q−1], 1 ≤ i ≤ |Q|−q+1 in the query, start from the root node and
traverse the tree. At depth l, choose the link corresponding to character Q[i + l + 1].
If at any depth-l node, there is no link corresponding to character Q[i + l + 1], then
the substring is not present in the text. If we reach the end of the substring, then we
have found a match and the substring is present in the text. A formal description of
q-gram matching algorithm using T is presented in Algorithm 1.
Consider the problem of matching the query Q = (011000) for the tree shown in
Figure 1 with q = 4. Substrings of length 4 are (0110, 1100, 1000). For substring
0110, we will travel nodes (0, 1, 4, 9, 16), in the given order, and reach the end of the
substring. But when we try substring 1100, we will traverse nodes (0, 2, 6, 12) and
then stop at node-12 because there is no link for character 0. At this point we can
conclude that substring 1100 is not present in the text. Substring 1000 is matched
successfully by traversing nodes (0, 2, 5, 10, 17). The above matching process takes at
most O(q) steps to match each substring present in the query. Thus, |Q| length query
will take O(q|Q|) time.
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3.2.3 Tree Redundancy Pruning
The number of nodes in the tree increases with the number of unique substrings in
the text and with the tree depth. The space required to store the tree may become
unmanageable for a very large number of unique substrings. We have developed a
tree redundancy pruning algorithm which removes redundant nodes present in a tree.
Let us revisit the tree constructed in Figure 1. By looking at node-6, one can
infer that substring 11 can be followed by only 01. Now suppose we are matching
query (011xy). While matching 011x, we can stop after reaching node-9. Then we
can check if x is equal to 0 or not while matching the next substring 11xy. Thus,
we can safely remove the child node (node-16) of node-9. This removal of node-16
should not affect the substring matching capability of the tree. Similarly, the child
of node-11 can be removed because the existence of 1 after 101 can be checked while
matching the next substring 01?? (‘?’ matches all characters.) Following the same
idea, we can remove all the children of node-3.
Suppose we construct a tree (T ) with depth q as shown in Figure 2(a). If for any
node xX at depth l, the (q− l)-depth subtree rooted at xX is similar1 to the subtree
rooted at node X, we remove the subtree of node xX and make node xX a leaf node.
We repeat this for all the nodes. The final tree (Tp) will be the pruned version of the
original tree (T ). Pseudo-code for pruning a tree is given in Algorithm A. A pruned
version of the tree in Figure 1 is shown in Figure 3.
To prune a tree, for each node, we need to compare the subtree rooted at that
node and the subtree rooted at its immediate suffix node. Comparison of two trees
takes time linear to the number of nodes in the tree. Thus the total time required to
prune the tree is O(N2T ), where NT is total number of nodes in the tree.










(a) Pruning Algorithm: Subtrees S1








(b) Marking previous substrings af-
ter finding a mismatch.
Figure 2: (a) Tree redundancy pruning algorithm; (b) matching using pruned tree.
In both figures, a path up to the solid and dash-dot lines are present in the pruned
tree. The dotted part is pruned or absent in the tree.
Consider the substring matching problem with query Q[1, · · · , m]. While match-
ing a substring Q[i, · · · , i+q−1], if we reach the end of the substring Q[i, · · · , i+q−1],
it is successfully matched and is accepted. If we find a mismatch at character
Q[i+ l +1], 0 ≤ l ≤ q− 2, (see Figure 2(b)), the substrings Q[i− q + l +2, · · · , i+ l +
1], Q[i− q + l + 3, · · · , i + l + 2], · · · , Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] are marked rejected. If any
node in the path of Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] is pruned, we may reach the leaf node before
the end of the substring. In such a case we just mark it as pending and continue
to match the next substrings. In the end, the substrings which are not rejected and
marked pending are accepted. The detailed description of the matching algorithm
using Tp is given in Algorithm 3.
The complexity of the matching algorithm depends on the effect of pruning on
the text and also on the query string. The worst case can be O(q|Q|), which is same
as the original tree matching algorithm. We will discuss more results on the effect of
pruning in section 3.4.2.





























Figure 3: The pruned version of the tree shown in Figure 1. The subtrees of nodes
3, 9, and 11 were removed because they were similar to the subtrees of nodes 1, 6,
and 4, respectively.
Proof We shall first prove that if a substring Q[i, · · · , i+q−1] is accepted by the tree
T , then it should also be accepted by the pruned tree Tp. If node Q[i, · · · , i+ q−1] is
not pruned, then we will reach the end of the substring while matching it, and it will
be accepted by the pruned tree. But if the path to node Q[i, · · · , i + q− 1] is pruned
at Q[i, · · · , i+j] (see Figure 4(a)), then it will be marked pending. Consider matching
the next q − 1 substrings (Q[i + α + 1, · · · , i + α + q], ∀ 0 ≤ α ≤ q − 2). We should
not find any mismatch before character Q[i + q] because Q[i + α + 1, · · · , i + q − 1]
are substrings of Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1]. Thus Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] will not be marked as
rejected because there is no future mismatch in the overlapping substrings, and will
be accepted by the pruned tree Tp.
Now we will prove the second part, that if a substring is rejected by tree T , then
it will also be rejected by pruned tree Tp. Suppose substring Q[i, · · · , i + q− 1] is not
matched successfully in T at character Q[i + l + 1], 1 ≤ l ≤ q − 2. If the path is not
pruned then the substring will also be rejected by the pruned tree. Suppose the path is
pruned at Q[i, · · · , i+j], for some 1 ≤ j ≤ l. Suppose character Q[i+l] is not pruned in
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(a) Successful matching of sub-
string Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1]. There
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(b) Subtrees Si, · · · , Si+l′−1 are sim-
ilar (identical up to length q−j−1)
to subtree Si+l′ . All these subtrees
except Si+l′ are pruned.
Figure 4: Proof of correctness of matching algorithm using pruned tree. The paths
up to the solid and dash-dot lines are present in the pruned tree. The dotted part is
pruned or absent in the tree.
Si+α, ∀ 0 ≤ α < l′, are similar to the subtree Si+l′ . Since path Q[i+j+1, · · · , i+l+1]
is not present in subtree Si, the path will not be present in subtree Si+l′ . Thus while
checking for substring Q[i + l′, · · · , i + l′ + q − 1], we will find a mismatch at node
Q[i + l′, · · · , i + l]. This is because character Q[i + l + 1] is not supposed to follow
character Q[i + l] in subtree Si+l′ . At this point substring Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] will be
marked rejected along with all the substrings Q[i + k, · · · , i + k + q − 1], 0 ≤ k ≤ l′.
3.2.4 Suffix Links
Let us consider the unpruned tree developed in Section 3.2.2. The matching process
described for the tree involves duplicated checking. This is due to the overlap of
consecutive substrings. We are checking the presence of sub-substring Q[i+1, · · · , i+
q − 1] while matching both substrings Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] and Q[i + 1, · · · , i + q]. To
remove these redundant checks, we include suffix links in the tree structure. The
idea of a suffix link was introduced by McCreight [37] to build a time efficient suffix
search tree. Suffix link at each node points to the immediate suffix of the substring
corresponding to that node. For example, suffix link at node xX should point to
node X. When we match substring xX, we can trace the suffix link and go directly




































Figure 5: Tree shown in Figure 1 with suffix links. Solid lines are the regular links
to child nodes. Dashed lines are suffix links. The path traced by the bold solid and
dashed lines, (0, 1, 4, 9, 16, 12, 5, 10, 17), is the path followed while matching query
011000. A mismatch is found at node-12 where there is no child for character 0.
We only need to check the last character of the next substring.
To add suffix links in the unpruned tree, traverse to each node xX in the tree and
create a suffix link from node xX to node X. Suffix link at the root node points to
itself. Pseudo-code for adding suffix link in an unpruned tree is given in Algorithm 4.
Figure 5 shows an example tree with suffix links. Creating a suffix link from a depth-l
node requires us to traverse from a root to its suffix. This will take O(l) time. Thus,
to construct a suffix link of every node in the tree (with depth q) will take worst-case
O(qNT ) time, where NT is total number of nodes in the tree.
Consider the substring matching problem with query Q[1, · · · , m]. For the first
substring, we start from the root node and go down until we find a mismatch or
reach a leaf node. If we reach a leaf node Q[i, · · · , i + q− 1] after matching character
Q[i + q− 1], we accept the substring Q[i, · · · , i + q− 1]. To match the next substring
Q[i + 1, · · · , i + q], we traverse the suffix link and try to match character Q[i + q].
If we find a mismatch while trying to match character Q[i + l + 1] at node
Q[i, · · · , i + l], we reject Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1]. To match the next substring Q[i +
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1, · · · , i + q], we traverse the suffix link to reach node Q[i + 1, · · · , i + l] and continue
the matching process by checking for character Q[i + l + 1]. We can continue in a
similar fashion until we reach the end of the query. A detailed description of substring
matching using Ts is shown in Algorithm 5.
The complete path traced while matching query (011000) is shown in bold in
Figure 5. Before proving the equivalence of substring matching with trees T and Ts,
we would like to state some properties that are hold during substring matching using
Ts.
Lemma 3.2.1 If while matching query Q[1, · · · , m] using Ts, we have processed up
to Q[i], then the current node is the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , i] present in the tree
Ts.
By Induction For i = 1, it is trivial to see that we will be at the longest suffix
of string Q[1] after processing Q[1]. If character Q[1] is present in the tree, we
will progress to node Q[1]. If Q[1] is not present in the tree, we will be at the
root node. Suppose the lemma holds for some i = k < m and the current node
X = Q[k−l+1, · · · , k] is the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , k] present in the tree. Suppose
the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , k + 1] present in the tree is Q[k − l′ + 1, · · · , k, k + 1],
0 ≤ l′ ≤ l. In this case, node Q[k− l′+1, · · · , k] will have child Q[k+1]. Also, none of
Q[k−j+1, · · · , k], l′ < j < l will have child Q[k+1], otherwise Q[k−j+1, · · · , k+1]
is the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , k+1] present in the tree. We want to prove that after
processing Q[k+1] we will reach node Q[k− l′+1, · · · , k, k+1]. While trying a match
for Q[k+1], starting from node X, we will traverse through l− l′ suffix links checking
for child Q[k +1]. We will find a match only when we reach node Q[k− l′ +1, · · · , k].
At this point we will traverse the child node of Q[k − l′ + 1, · · · , k] and reach node
Q[k− l′ + 1, · · · , k + 1]. Thus, we will be at the longest suffix node of Q[1, · · · , k + 1]
after processing Q[k + 1]. By induction, the lemma should hold for all i ≤ m.
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Theorem 3.2.2 Substring matching using Ts is equivalent to substring matching us-
ing T .
Proof To show the equivalence of the two matching algorithms, we will prove that
if a substring Q[i, · · · , i + q− 1] in a query is accepted by T , then it will be accepted
by Ts, and vice versa. If substring Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] is accepted by tree T , then
there exists a leaf node Q[i, · · · , i+q−1] in the tree which is also the longest possible
suffix of Q[1, · · · , i + q − 1] present in the tree. While matching the query using tree
Ts, after we process Q[i + q − 1], according to lemma 3.2.1, we will reach the longest
suffix node of Q[1, · · · , i+ q−1] present in the tree. From above, this node is the leaf
node Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1]. Thus, tree Ts will also accept substring Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1].
Also, if tree Ts accepts Q[i, · · · , i+q−1], it means that after processing Q[i+q−1],
we will be at depth-q leaf node, say X. According to lemma 3.2.1, X should also be
the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , i + q − 1]. But length q suffix of Q[1, · · · , i + q − 1] is
Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1]. This means that node X corresponds to node Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1].
Since node Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] is present in the tree, substring Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] will
also be accepted by the tree T .
The above matching algorithm is linear to the length of the query. For a traversal
of a child link in the tree, we are successfully matching a character and progressing to
the next character. For a suffix link traversal from a non-leaf node, we are successfully
finding a substring mismatch and we can proceed to the next substring while rejecting
the current substring. For a suffix link traversal from a leaf node, we are successfully
finding a matching substring and we can proceed to the next substring while accepting
the current substring. There are |Q| characters in the query and |Q|−q+1 substrings.
Thus, the total number of link traversals including child nodes and suffix links is at




























Figure 6: Suffix links added to the pruned tree shown in Figure 3. Solid lines are
child links and dashed are suffix links. Node-17’s immediate suffix node-7 was pruned
from the tree. So it points to immediate suffix node of node-7. Bold lines show
the path traced by matching algorithm for query (011000). At node-12 we found a
mismatch and substring 1100 was marked rejected.
3.2.5 Pruned Trees with Suffix Links
As with the original tree, we would like to add suffix links in the pruned tree to make
the matching process faster. But we cannot make a direct link from a node xX to
its immediate suffix node X because it is possible that the node X was deleted in
the pruning process. Consider a node Q[i, · · · , i + j] present in the pruned tree. The
longest suffix of Q[i, · · · , i + j] present in the tree is Q[i + l′, · · · , i + j]. Suppose we
reach node Q[i, · · · , i+ j] while matching a substring. While matching the next l′−1
substrings, we will not match beyond Q[i+j] because the path is pruned before Q[i+j]
(see Figure 4(b)). Since we have already matched up to Q[i + j] successfully, there is
no need to check these l′ − 1 substrings. Thus, when we reach node Q[i, · · · , i + j],
we can directly go to node Q[i + l′, · · · , i + j] and continue checking. Thus, the suffix
link at the node Q[i, · · · , i + j] points to the node Q[i + l′, · · · , i + j].
To add suffix links in a pruned tree, traverse to each node X in the tree and create
a suffix link from node X to node Y , where Y is the longest suffix node of X present
in the pruned tree. The suffix link at the root node points to itself. Pseudo-code for
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adding suffix links in a pruned tree is given in Algorithm 6. Figure 6 shows a pruned
tree with suffix links. Substring matching using tree Tsp is very similar to substring
matching using tree Ts.
Consider the substring matching problem with query Q[1, · · · , m]. For the first
substring, we start from the root node and go down until we find a mismatch or reach
a leaf node. If we reach a depth-q node (a leaf node) Q[i, · · · , i+q−1] after matching
character Q[i + q− 1], we accept the substring Q[i, · · · , i + q− 1]. To match the next
substring Q[i + 1, · · · , i + q], we traverse the suffix link and try to match character
Q[i + q].
Suppose we reach a leaf node Q[i, · · · , i + l], l < q − 1, after matching character
Q[i + l]. This means that children of this node were pruned during the redundancy
pruning. We mark substring Q[i, · · · , i+ q−1] as pending. To match next substring,
we traverse the suffix link and try to match character Q[i + l + 1].
On the other hand if we find a mismatch at node Q[i, · · · , i + l] for character
Q[i + l + 1], then the substrings Q[i− q + l + 2, · · · , i + l + 1], Q[i− q + l + 3, · · · , i +
l + 2], · · · , Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] are marked rejected. After marking the substring, we
traverse the suffix link of node Q[i, · · · , i + l] and continue matching Q[i + l + 1] for
the next substring Q[i + 1, · · · , i + q]. At the end, all the substrings which are not
marked rejected are accepted. The formal description of the matching algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 7.
The path traced while matching the query Q = (011000) for the tree in Figure 6 is
shown in bold lines. Before proving the equivalence of substring matching with trees
Tp and Tsp, we would like to state some properties of substring matching using Tsp.
Lemma 3.2.2 If while matching query Q[1, · · · , m], we have processed up to Q[i],
then the current node is the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , i] present in tree Tsp.
by Induction For i = 1, it is trivial to see that we will be at the longest suffix
of string Q[1] after processing Q[1]. If character Q[1] is present in the tree, we
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will progress to node Q[1]. If Q[1] is not present in the tree, we will be at the
root node. Suppose the lemma holds for some i = k < m and the current node
X = Q[k−l+1, · · · , k] is the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , k] present in the tree. Suppose
the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , k + 1] present in the tree is Q[k − l′ + 1, · · · , k, k + 1],
0 ≤ l′ ≤ l. In this case node Q[k − l′ + 1, · · · , k] will have child Q[k + 1] and nodes
Q[k − j + 1, · · · , k], l′ < j ≤ l are either pruned or do not have child Q[k + 1].
While trying a match for Q[k + 1], we will travel through suffix links checking for
child Q[k + 1]. We will find a match only when we reach node Q[k − l′ + 1, · · · , k].
At this point we will traverse child node of Q[k − l′ + 1, · · · , k] and reach node
Q[k− l′ + 1, · · · , k + 1]. Thus we will be at the longest suffix node of Q[1, · · · , k + 1]
after processing Q[k + 1]. By induction lemma should hold for all i ≤ m.
Theorem 3.2.3 Substring matching using Tsp is equivalent to substring matching
using Tp.
Proof To show the equivalence of two matching algorithms, we will prove that if a
substring Q[i, · · · , i+ q− 1] is marked accepted by Tp, then it will be marked accepted
by Tsp, and vice versa. We will also prove that if a mismatch is found while matching
substring Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] by Tp, then a mismatch will be found by Tsp, and vice
versa. From these two observations, it is implied that if a query is marked first as
pending in Tp and accepted (or rejected) later, it will be marked as pending in Tsp and
accepted (or rejected) later, and vice versa.
If substring Q[i, · · · , i+q−1] is marked accepted by tree Tsp, then after processing
Q[i + q − 1], we will be at depth-q leaf node, say X. According to lemma 3.2.2,
X should also be the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , i + q − 1]. But length q suffix of
Q[1, · · · , i+ q−1] is Q[i, · · · , i+ q−1]. This means that node X corresponds to node
Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1]. Since node Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] is present in the tree, substring
Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] will be accepted by tree Tp.
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If substring Q[i, .., i + q− 1] is marked accepted by tree Tp, then there exists a leaf
node Q[i, · · · , i+q−1] in the tree, which is also the longest suffix of Q[1, · · · , i+q−1]
present in the tree. While matching query using tree Tsp, after we process Q[i+q−1],
according to lemma 3.2.2, we will reach the longest suffix node of Q[1, · · · , i + q − 1]
present in the tree. From the above, this node is a leaf node Q[i, .., i + q − 1]. Thus
Tsp will accept substring Q[i, .., i + q − 1].
If Tsp finds a mismatch for substring Q[i, · · · , i+q−1] at node Q[i, · · · , i+j], then
node Q[i, · · · , i+j] does not have child Q[i+j+1]. While matching Q[i, · · · , i+q−1]
using Tp, we will reach node Q[i, · · · , i + j], and find a mismatch while looking for
child Q[i + j + 1].
Suppose Tp finds a mismatch for substring Q[i, · · · , i+q−1] at node Q[i, · · · , i+j].
While matching using Tsp, after we match character Q[i+j], according to lemma 3.2.2,
we will be at the longest suffix node of Q[1, · · · , i+j]. Suppose the longest suffix node
is Q[i− l, · · · , i+j], 0 ≤ l ≤ q−j−1. Since Q[i+j+1] is not a child of Q[i, · · · , i+j],
Q[i + j + 1] can not be a child of Q[i− l′, · · · , i + j], ∀0 ≤ l′ ≤ l. Thus, we will find a
mismatch at node Q[i− l, · · · , i+j] while matching substring Q[i− l, · · · , i− l+q−1],
and traverse the suffix link and again try to match Q[i + j + 1]. We will continue
to find mismatch, traverse suffix links and will eventually reach node Q[i, · · · , i + j]
and still cannot match character Q[i + j + 1]. Thus, we have found a mismatch for
Q[i, · · · i + q − 1].
Corollary 3.2.1 Substring matching with Tsp is equivalent to substring matching us-
ing T .
Proof This is followed immediately from Theorem 3.2.1 and Theorem 3.2.3.
The above matching algorithm is linear to the length of the query. For every child
link traversal, we successfully match a character and progress to the next character.
For every suffix link traversal from a leaf node, we mark the current substring as
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accepted or pending and proceed to the next substring. For every suffix link traversal
from a non-leaf node, we find a substring mismatch and proceed to match the next
substring after marking the previous overlapping pending substrings as rejected.
Finally, every substring is marked either once, accepted or rejected, or twice, first
pending and then accepted or rejected. There are |Q| characters in the query and
|Q| − q + 1 substrings. Thus, the total number of link traversals including child and
suffix links is at most |Q|+ 2× (|Q| − q + 1) = O(|Q|).
3.3 String Matching
3.3.1 Exact String Matching
If T is the text and Q is the query, then the exact string matching problem is to find
if Q is a substring of T . We will prove that we can use the above q-gram matching for
exact string matching. But first, we will prove some results on the number of nodes
at a given depth of the tree. We will assume that the text is converted to an infinite
length string by adding an infinite number of end symbol ($) at the end.
Theorem 3.3.1 For any depth l, N(l) ≤ N(l + 1), where N(l) is the number of
nodes at depth l in tree T .
Proof Every node X in the tree should have at least one child x. Otherwise, the text
string will end after we encounter X in the text. But this is a contradiction because
X is assumed to be an infinite length string. Thus, for every node at depth l, we will
have at least one node at depth l + 1. Thus, the number of nodes at depth l + 1 is at
least N(l).
Theorem 3.3.2 ∃l0, s.t. N(l0) = N(l0 + 1)
Proof Assume N(l) < N(l + 1) for all l. For l = |T | + 2, where |T | is the length
of original text without end symbols added at the end, we will have N(l) > |T | + 1.
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But the number of unique substrings cannot be more than |T |+ 1. We have reached
a contradiction. Thus, ∃l0, s.t.N(l0) = N(l0 + 1).
Theorem 3.3.3 If, for some depth l0, N(l0 + 1) = N(l0), then
N(l + 1) = N(l) = N(l0), ∀l ≥ l0, (1)
Proof If we go down the tree, the number of nodes will increase if and only if there is
at least one node with two or more children. Suppose the theorem does not hold for
some l ≥ l0, that is N [l + 1] > N [l] and node X[1, · · · , l] at depth l has two children
x and x′. Since the substrings X[1, · · · , l]x and X[1, · · · , l]x′ are present in the tree,
their suffix X[l − l0, · · · , l]x and X[l − l0, · · · , l]x′ should also be present in the tree.
Then the depth l0 node X[l − l0, · · · , l] should have two children for x and x′. Thus,










Figure 7: String matching of text T and query Q. X is longest prefix match of Q
present in T . Alphabets x and y are different.
Exact String Matching Algorithm Given a text T , make it an infinite length
string by adding special end symbols at the end. Build a (l0 +1)-depth tree where the
number of nodes stops increasing after depth l0. Given a query Q, perform q-gram
matching with q = l0 + 1. If no mismatch is found then the query is a substring of
the text, otherwise it is not.
Theorem 3.3.4 Query Q is a substring of text T if and only if no mismatch is found
while performing q-gram matching with q = l0 + 1, where N(l0 + 1) = N(l0).
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Proof It is easy to see that if the query is a substring of the text, then there will
be no mismatch. We need to prove that if Q is not a substring of the text, then we
will have at least one mismatching q-gram. Suppose the maximum prefix match of a
query in the text starts at i-th position in T and the length of matched prefix is l. If
l ≤ l0, then substring Q[i, · · · , i + l0] is not present in the text and while performing
q-gram matching, we will find a mismatch for this substring. The case where l > l0 is
shown in Figure 7. Alphabet x and y are different. Since the substring Xx is in the
text, it should be present in the tree. Since node X is depth-l0 node, it cannot have
two children, otherwise, N(l0) < N(l0 + 1). Thus, substring Xy cannot be present in
the tree because otherwise depth l0 node X will have two children, namely, x and y.
So we will find a mismatch at node X in the tree while matching character y from
the query. Thus, the exact matching problem is the same as q-gram matching.



























Figure 8: Length-3 substring matching of query 011000 using the tree in constructed
in Figure 6. All the nodes at depth 3 are considered leaves and all nodes below them
(i.e. node 17 and 19) are considered non-existent. When we reach nodes 12 and 10,
we do not try to go any further down to depth-4 node. Instead we traverse the suffix
links and continue matching the next character for the next length-3 substring.
The tree model can be used to perform q-gram matching where q is the same as
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the maximum depth of the tree. But in many cases, one does not know what sequence
length is appropriate. Also, one might need to use different values of q depending
on the policy and the situation. For example, in intrusion detection, the value of q
is determined by the current required false alarm rate and detection rate. One may
want to have larger q for a better detection rate and sometimes a smaller q for a
small false alarm rate. We would not want to create a separate tree for each sequence
length. This would require more resources and might be cumbersome to maintain.
Given a desired maximum sequence length (say L), we can construct a pruned
tree with suffix links as proposed earlier. This tree can be used to perform substring
matching of lengths smaller or equal to L. While matching for length q < L, we can
assume that all the nodes at depth q are leaves and there are no nodes below depth q.
Now we can use the same algorithm proposed above for length q substring matching.
Consider the problem of matching the text 1000011011 (the original tree is shown
in Figure 1) with query 011000 for sequence length 3. All 3-grams in the query are
present in the text and we should not find any mismatch. Figure 8 shows the path
followed by the algorithm while matching 011000 for sequence length 3.
3.4 Evaluation
We use performance measurements to show the effectiveness of the pruning algorithm.
We demonstrate the savings in space because of pruning. We also show the average
time complexity of the substring matching using the pruned tree Tp. These two
experiments also help us understand the use of tree redundancy pruning to reduce
the matching overhead when using pruned tree Tp.
3.4.1 Dataset
For our experimentation purpose, we use the system call sequence datasets made
available by University of New Mexico (UNM). These datasets were generated for the
stide intrusion detection system developed at UNM [64]. The character size is the
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number of different possible system calls, which is equal to 182. In order to collect the
data, the given program was started and requests were sent to this program. These
requests were either sent by a real user or automatically generated by a program.
During the processing of requests, the program makes some calls to the underlying
operating system. We can use the trace command to record these system calls made
by the program in the order they were invoked. The properties of the datasets in-
cluding their sizes are shown in Table 1. Each dataset consists of multiple sequences
generated by multiple runs of the program. As the name suggests, synthetic sendmail
and synthetic ftp datasets were generated at UNM using automatically generated
synthetic requests. Real Sendmail data was generated by an MIT sendmail server
with real user requests. Since the MIT system call trace was very large, only a small
fraction (consisting of 5.3 million data points) was used in our experiments. Further
information about the dataset may be obtained from [64].
Table 1: System call data
DataSet Filename Number of System Calls
Synthetic Sendmail sendmail.daemon 1.556M
Synthetic FTP nonself1 180,315
Real Sendmail MIT 5.23M
To observe the effect of tree redundancy pruning on other datasets, we also gener-
ated some random data. In particular, we generated random data with independent
Bernoulli distribution and Markovian distribution. Mathematical formulation for
Bernoulli distribution is shown in equation 2.
si =
 1, with probability p;0, with probability 1− p (2)
where p is the probability of occurrence of 1 in data.
In a markov model, the current output depends on the current state of the model.
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For simplicity, we are assuming a simple markov model with binary output. The
current output depends on values of the previous two outputs. The sequence satisfies
the following stochastic distribution:
si =

1, if (si−2, si−1) = (0, 0);
0, if (si−2, si−1) = (1, 1);
1 with prob. p1, if (si−2, si−1) = (0, 1);
1 with prob. p2, if (si−2, si−1) = (1, 0)
(3)
where p1 and p2 are two prescribed probabilities.
The properties of Bernoulli and Markovian datasets are shown in Table 2. We
used two separate Bernoulli datasets with different values of p.
Table 2: Bernoulli and Markovian Dataset
DataSet Parameters Number of data points
Bernoulli p = 0.25 250,000
Bernoulli p = 0.50 250,000

























































(b) Bernoulli and Markovian Data
Figure 9: Number of Unique Sequences in Dataset
Figure 9 shows the number of unique sequences in the different datasets. As we
expect, the number of unique sequences increases as we increase the sequence length.
The MIT dataset shows more diversity and the number of unique sequences increases
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rapidly. For the ftp and sendmail dataset, the number of unique sequences remains
very low and increases very slowly. For Markovian and Bernoulli dataset, the number
of unique sequences increases very fast. This is due to the random nature of these
datasets. For Bernoulli dataset, the number of unique sequences stops increasing
rapidly after sequence length 24 when it approaches its maximum value of |T | − q,
where |T | is the number of data points and q is the sequence length.
3.4.2 Experiments
To determine the average time complexity of substring matching using a pruned tree
Tp, we calculate the average depth of leaf nodes in the tree. This gives us the expected






where Leaves is the set of all leaf nodes.
The space required to store a tree is directly proportional to the number of nodes
and links in the tree. For each node in the tree, there is one incoming link from its
parent and one outgoing suffix link. Thus, the number of links is twice the number of
nodes. Thus, the space required to store the tree is roughly three times the number
of nodes in the tree. In order to compare the space requirements of the unpruned
and pruned trees, we calculate the number of nodes for both. We also compared the
average space requirements for tree structures with those for hash-tables. Assuming
the load factor of hash-table is 1, the minimum space required by the hash-table is
q×#(entries in hash− table), where q is the sequence length. The number of entries
in the hash-table is equal to the number of unique substrings in the text.
Spacetree = 3×NT , (5)



















































(b) Bernoulli and Markovian Data
Figure 10: Average depth as a function of sequence length. Solid lines in the figure
corresponds to the average depth of the unpruned trees. The average depth of the
unpruned trees is equal to the sequence length for all the datasets.
3.4.3 Results
Figure 10 shows the effect of pruning on the average depth of the tree for different
sequence lengths. Every leaf node in the unpruned tree is at depth q, where q is
the sequence length. Thus, the average depth of the unpruned tree is the same as
the sequence length for all datasets. Compared with the unpruned tree, the average
depth of the pruned tree increases slowly as we increase the sequence length. Thus,
even if we increase the sequence length, there is a small increase in the amount of
processing required to match a substring using pruned tree Tp. The effect of pruning is
more apparent for ftp and sendmail.daemon data as we increase the sequence length.
Pruning reduces the average depth by very small value for the Markovian dataset.
The subtrees rooted at the bottom of the tree are similar to the subtrees rooted at
their suffix nodes. Therefore, they are pruned during the redundancy pruning. Thus,
the average depth reduces by a small value. For Bernoulli dataset, pruning works
very well for small sequence lengths. This is because for small q, Bernoulli data
contains all the possible length-q substrings. Thus, after pruning, the tree reduces
to a depth-1 tree with just 3 nodes. For larger sequence lengths, there is not much
gain from pruning for Bernoulli data because the data is random in nature. After
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sequence length 24 when the number of unique sequences stops increasing rapidly,



































































































































































(f) Bernoulli data (p=0.50)
Figure 11: Space complexity of different datasets.
The space required to store the unpruned and pruned tree is shown in Figure 11.
It also shows the minimum space required for a hash-table based matching scheme.
For a practical hash-tables with few collisions, we would require more space. The
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space requirement of the unpruned tree is slightly more than the hash-table scheme.
But for the pruned tree, the space requirement is much less. This means that many of
the nodes are being pruned during the pruning process. For larger sequence lengths,
pruning reduces the space complexity by an order of 10. Thus, pruning yields a large
space saving.
The space requirement for Markovian and Bernoulli datasets is shown in Figure 11
(d), (e), & (f), respectively. For both datasets, space requirement of the unpruned
tree is smaller than the hash-table. For Bernoulli dataset, space requirement of hash-
table eventually becomes less than the unpruned tree for higher sequence lengths.
As for the system call data, pruning shows large savings in space and reduces the
space requirement by 4 times. Change in space requirements is more visible for larger
sequence lengths.
3.4.4 Comparison with Rabin-Karp
In addition to the above experiments, we also compared our tree model with the
Rabin-Karp based hashing technique. For this purpose, we implemented both algo-
rithms in C++. For the given training data, we built a pruned tree with suffix links
and performed matching for the testing data. For the Rabin-Karp algorithm, for the
given training data, we generated hashes for all the given length substrings present
in the data and stored them in the hash-table. While matching the test data, we
efficiently generated the successive hashes and checked if that hash value was present
in the hash-table. If hash value was found, we considered it as a match. We did not
perform further exact matching. If we did not find the value in the table, we got
a mismatch. For hashing purposes, we considered a substring as a number in some
base. The hash value of the substring was simply the number represented by the
substring modulo a big prime. Equation 7 and 8 shows the hashing and rehashing
mechanism used in our implementation.
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hashXi = (xib
q−1 + · · ·+ xi+q−1) mod p, (7)
where X is the string, Xi is ith substring, xi is ith character in the string, p is a
random prime, and b is the base.
hashXi+1 = ((hashXi − bq−1xi)× b + xi+q) mod p (8)
Value of bq−1 can be pre-calculated once at the start. The above rehashing tech-
nique is efficient and takes constant time to calculate. Thus the first hash can be
calculated in time O(q) and further hashes can be calculated in constant time using
equation 8. Thus, the calculation of hashes of all the q-grams in the query will take
O(|Q|) time, which is linear to the length of the query. We used the same datasets
as earlier for comparison. We computed the time taken for preprocessing of the data
for both models and compared their runtime overhead for testing the data. For sim-
plicity, we used the same set of data for both training and testing. For efficiency, we
set b to 256 and p to a 32-bit random prime.
The time taken to train and perform substring matching is shown in figure 12.
For the tree-based algorithm, the training time is calculated as the sum of the time
taken to record the unique sequences, build the tree, create suffix links, prune the
suffix tree and adjust the suffix links. The training time for tree model is proportional
to the square of the size of the tree. The training time of the Rabin-Karp algorithm
depends on the time to compute the hash and the time to store the hash in a table.
Computing hashes takes constant time. Thus, the training time of Rabin-Karp does
not change much as we increase the sequence length. Compared with Rabin-Karp,
the tree model takes more time to train, and the time increases with sequence length.
This is acceptable because training is an offline process and is performed just once.
The matching time is almost constant for both algorithms and does not change




































































































































(f) Bernoulli data (p=0.50)
Figure 12: Training and matching time for substring matching.
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algorithm and the tree model are independent of the sequence length. The matching
time complexity of both algorithms is linear to the length of the query. The tree
model takes considerably less time for matching than Rabin-Karp. This is because
computation of rehash takes more time than traversing a link in the tree. Since
matching is an online process, even a small time saving can be a significant advantage.
3.5 Summary
When applied to q-gram matching problems with huge text size, the computation time
required by previous string matching algorithms become unacceptable. The Rabin-
Karp algorithm is the only known algorithm which works well for q-gram matching.
But the Rabin-Karp algorithm can produce false matches because of the limitations
of hashing. Also, for different values of q, the Rabin-Karp algorithm needs to create
separate hash-tables. This requires a large amount of space.
We presented a fast q-gram matching algorithm. The algorithm pre-processes
the text and stores it in a tree structure that is efficient for storage and addition
of new substrings. We also presented a pruning algorithm to reduce the size of the
tree. Suffix links were added to the tree structure to facilitate a linear time substring
matching algorithm. In addition, we proved that a substring tree of sufficient length
can be used to perform exact string matching. Finally, we performed experiments on
system call sequence data as well as Bernoulli and Markovian data to show the effect
of pruning on runtime and space overheads.
Construction of a tree T takes O(q|T |) time. In the worst case, redundancy
pruning and adding suffix links take O(NT
2) and O(NT q) time, respectively. The
matching algorithm using the tree T takes O(q|Q|) time. q-gram matching with the
pruned tree Tp has the worst case of O(q|Q|) time. But as seen in figure 10, the
expected time for matching is very small for system call data. When using trees with
suffix links, Ts or Tsp, the matching algorithm is linear to the size of query and does
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not depend on the size of the text. For system call data, the space requirement for the
unpruned tree with suffix links, Ts, is a little more than the hash-table based q-gram
matching system. But for the pruned tree with suffix links, Tsp, the space requirement
is very modest and is much smaller than that required for the hash-table. Even for
large sequence lengths, the space required to store a pruned tree is less than the
size of the text. The tree algorithm has a better running time for matching than the
Rabin-Karp algorithm. Also, the tree model has an additional advantage in its ability
to perform multiple length q-gram matching using the same tree.
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CHAPTER IV
ROBUSTNESS OF IDS AGAINST EVASION ATTACKS
In this section we will analyze the robustness of network anomaly detection systems.
First we will briefly discuss the attack polymorphism techniques and why anomaly
detection system are effective in detection of polymorphic attacks. Then we will look
at polymorphic blending attacks. We also present the case study for polymorphic
blending attacks using PAYL IDS. Then we present a formal framework for polymor-
phic blending attacks and analyze it. Then we show experimental results and finally
present techniques for improving robustness of IDSs.
4.1 Blending Attacks
4.1.1 Polymorphic Attacks
A polymorphic attack is an attack that is able to change its appearance with every
instance. Thus, there may be no fixed or predictable signature for the attack. As a
result, it may evade detection because most current intrusion detection systems and
anti-virus systems are signature-based. Exploit mutation and shellcode polymorphism
are two common ways to generate polymorphic attacks. In general, there are five
components in a polymorphic attack:
1. Attack Vector: an attack vector is used for exploiting the vulnerability of the
target host. Certain parts of the attack vector can be modified to create mutated
but still valid exploits. Several attack mutation techniques [23, 44, 66, 48] have
been proposed to transform attack vector. Some of the common techniques
used for attack mutation are http transformation, multiple requests in same
connection, ftp request padding, tcp packet fragmentation, etc. There might
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still be certain parts, called the invariant, of the attack vector that have to be
present in every mutant for the attack to work. If the attack invariant is very
small and exists in the normal traffic, then an IDS may not be able to use it as
a signature because it will result in a high number of false positives.
2. Attack Body: the code that performs the intended malicious actions after the
vulnerability is exploited. Common techniques to achieve attack body (shell-
code) polymorphism include register shuffling, equivalent instruction substitu-
tion, instruction reordering, garbage insertions, and encryption. Different keys
can be used in encryption for different instances of the attack to ensure that
the byte sequence is different every time.
3. Polymorphic Decryptor: this section contains the part of the code that decrypts
the shellcode. It decrypts the encrypted attack body and transfers control to
it. Polymorphism of the decryptor can be achieved using various code obfusca-
tion techniques such as instruction reordering, instruction substitution, register
shuffling, and nop insertions.
4. Decryption table: used by polymorphic decryptor to decrypt the encrypted
attack code.
5. Padding: extra junk data appended in the attack for obfuscation purpose.
4.1.1.1 Anomaly Detection System
The polymorphic attacks generated using different attack mutation and code ob-
fuscation techniques are very effective in evading misuse detection system. Anomaly
detection systems [71, 30, 31] that look at the payload of a packet have been proposed
to detect the polymorphic attack. A normal HTTP request packet predominantly con-
tains printable ASCII characters. Figure 13(a) shows the byte frequency distribution
of a normal HTTP request packet payload. On the other hand, polymorphic attack
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instances contain exploit code and input data that are typically not used in normal
activities. The exploit code and the data may contain characters that have very low
probability of appearing in a normal packet. Figure 13(b) shows the byte frequency
distribution of a polymorphic attack packet payload. An anomaly IDS can easily
differentiate between polymorphic attack instances and normal packets by looking at
the byte frequency distribution of the packet payload. PAYL anomaly IDS [71, 72],
which monitors the n-gram (or equivalently q-gram) frequency distribution of packet









































Figure 13: Character distribution of normal and attack packets
4.1.2 Polymorphic Blending Attacks
Clearly, if a polymorphic attack can “blend in” with (or “look” like) normal, it can
evade detection by an anomaly-based IDS. Normal traffic contains a lot of syntactic
and semantic information, but only a very small amount of such information can
be used by a high speed network-based anomaly IDS. This is due to fundamental
difficulties in modeling complex systems and performance overhead concerns in real-
time monitoring. The network traffic profile used by high speed anomaly IDS, e.g.,
PAYL, typically includes simple statistics such as maximum or average size and rate
of packets, frequency distribution of bytes in packets, and range of tokens at different
offsets.
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Given the incompleteness and the imprecision of the normal profiles based on
simple traffic statistics, it is quite feasible to launch what we call polymorphic blending
attacks. The main idea is that, when generating a polymorphic attack instance, care
can be taken so that its payload characteristics, as measured by the anomaly IDS,
will match the normal profile. For example, in order to evade detection by PAYL
[71, 72], the polymorphic attack instance can carefully choose the characters used in
encryption and pad the attack payload with a chosen set of characters, so that the
resulting byte frequency of the attack instance closely matches the normal profiles
and thus will be considered normal by PAYL.
4.1.2.1 A Realistic Attack Scenario
Before presenting the general strategies and techniques used in polymorphic blend-
ing attacks, we present an attack scenario and argue that such attacks are realistic.
Figure 14 shows the attack scenario that is the basis of our case study. There are a
few assumptions behind this scenario:
• The adversary has already compromised a host X inside a network A which
communicates with the target host Y inside network B. Network A and host
X may lack sufficient security so that the attack can penetrate without getting
detected, or the adversary may collude with an insider.
• The adversary has knowledge of the IDS (IDSB) that monitors the victim host
network. This might be possible using a variety of approaches, e.g., social
engineering (e.g., company sales or purchase data), fingerprinting, or trial-and-
error. We argue that one cannot assume that the IDS deployment is a secret, and
security by obscurity is a very weak position. We assume IDSB is a payload
statistics based system (e.g., PAYL). Since the adversary knows the learning
algorithm being used by IDSB, given some packet data from X to Y , the
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Figure 14: Attack Scenario of Polymorphic Blending Attack
adversary will be able to generate its own version of the statistical normal profile
used by IDSB.
• A typical anomaly IDS has a threshold setting that can be adjusted to obtain
a desired false positive rate. We assume that the adversary does not know
the exact value of the threshold used by IDSB, but has an estimation of the
generally acceptable false positive and false negative rates. With this knowledge,
the adversary can estimate the error threshold when crafting a new attack
instance to match the IDS profile.
We now explain the attack scenario. Once the adversary has control of host X,
it observes the normal traffic going from X to Y . The adversary estimates a normal
profile for this traffic using the same modeling technique that IDSB uses. We call
this an artificial profile. With it, the adversary creates a mutated instance of itself
in such a way that the statistics of the mutated instance match the artificial profile.
When IDSB analyzes these mutated attack packets, it is unable to discern them from
normal traffic because the artificial profile can be very close to the actual profile in use
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by IDSB. Thus, the attack successfully infiltrates the network B and compromises
host Y .
4.1.2.2 Desired Characteristics
Clearly, the key for a polymorphic blending attack to succeed in evading an IDS is to
be able to learn an artificial profile that is very close to the actual normal profile used
by the IDS, and create polymorphic instances that match the artificial profile. There
are other desirable properties. First, the blending process (e.g., with encoding and
padding) should not result in an abnormally large attack size. Otherwise, a simple
detection heuristic will be to monitor the network flow size. Second, although we do
not put any constraint on the resources available to the adversary, the polymorphic
blending process should be economical in terms of time and space. Otherwise, it
will not only slow down the attack, but also increase the chance of detection by
the local IDS (e.g., IDSA or host-based IDS.) More formally, given a description of
the algorithm that the IDS uses to learn and match the normal profile and an attack
instance, the time (and space) complexity of the algorithm used to apply polymorphic
blending to the attack instance should be a small degree polynomial with respect to
the initial attack size. Algorithms that require exponential time and space may not
be practical. Since the learning time should be small, the blending algorithm should
not require to collect a lot of normal packets to learn the normal statistics.
4.1.3 Steps of Polymorphic Blending Attacks
The polymorphic blending attack has three basic steps: (1) learn the IDS normal
profile; (2) encrypt the attack body; (3) and generate a polymorphic decryptor.
4.1.3.1 Learning The IDS Normal Profile
The task at hand for the adversary is to observe the normal traffic going from a host,
say X, to another host in the target network, say Y , and generate a normal profile
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close to the one used by the IDS at the target network, say IDSB, using the same
algorithm used by the IDS.
A simple method to get the normal data is by sniffing the network traffic going
from network A to host Y . This can be easily accomplished in a bus network. In
a switched environment, it may be harder to obtain such data. Since the adversary
knows the type of service running at the target host, he can simply generate normal
request packets and learn the artificial profile using these packets.
In theory, even if the adversary learns a profile from just a single normal packet,
and then mutates an attack instance so that it matches the statistics of the nor-
mal packet perfectly, the resulting polymorphic blended attack packet should not be
flagged as an anomaly by IDSB, provided the normal packet does not result in a false
positive in the first place. On the other hand, it is beneficial to generate an artificial
profile that is as close to the normal profile used by IDSB as possible, so that if a
polymorphic blended attack packet matches the artificial profile closely it has a high
chance of evading IDSB. In general, if more normal packets are captured and used
by the adversary, she will be able to learn an artificial normal profile that is closer to
the normal profile used by IDSB.
4.1.3.2 Attack Body Encryption
After learning the normal profile, the adversary creates a new attack instance and
encrypts (and blends) it to match the normal profile. A straightforward byte sub-
stitution scheme followed by padding can be used for encryption. The main idea
here is that every character in the attack body can be substituted by a character(s)
observed from the normal traffic using a substitution table. The encrypted attack
body can then be padded with some more garbage normal data so that the poly-
morphic blended attack packet can match the normal profile even better. To keep
the padding (and hence the packet size) minimal, the substituted attack body should
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already match the normal profile closely. We can use this design criterion to produce
a suitable substitution table.
To ensure that the substitution algorithm is reversible (for decrypting and running
the attack code), a one-to-one or one-to-many mapping can be used. A single-byte
substitution is preferred over multi-byte substitution because multi-byte substitution
will inflate the size of the attack body after substitution. An obvious requirement of
such encryption scheme is that the encrypted attack body should contain characters
from only the normal traffic. Although this may be hard for a general encryption
technique (because the output typically looks random), it is an easy requirement for
a simple byte substitution scheme. However, finding an optimal substitution table
that requires minimal padding is a complex problem. We can instead use a greedy
method to find an acceptable substitution table. The main idea is to first sort the
statistical features in the descending order of the frequency for both the attack body
and normal traffic. Then, for each unassigned entry with the highest frequency in the
attack body, we simply map it to an available (not yet mapped) normal entry with
the highest frequency. This procedure is repeated until all entries in the attack body
are mapped. The feature mapping can be translated to a character mapping and a
substitution table can be created for encryption and decryption purposes.
4.1.3.3 Polymorphic Decryptor
A decryptor first removes all the extra padding from the encrypted attack body and
then uses a reverse substitution table (or decoding table) to decrypt the attack body
to produce the original attack code (shellcode).
The decryptor is not encrypted but can be mutated using multiple iterations of
shellcode polymorphism processing (e.g., mapping an instruction to an equivalent
one randomly chosen from a set of candidates). To reverse the substitution done
during blending, the decryptor needs to look up a decoding table that contains the
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required reverse mappings. The decoding table for one-to-one mapping can be stored
in an array where the i-th entry of the array represents the normal character used to
substitute attack character i. Such an decoding table contains only normal characters.
Unused entries in the table can be used for padding. On the other hand, storage of
decoding tables for one-to-many mapping or variable-length mapping is complicated
and typically requires larger space.
4.1.4 Attack Design Issues
4.1.4.1 Incorporating Attack Vector and Decryptor
We discussed in Section 4.1.3.2 that the encryption of the attack body is guided by
the need to make the attack packet match the normal statistical profile (or more
precisely, the learned artificial profile).
The attack vector, decryptor, and substitution table are not encrypted. Their
addition to the attack packet payload alters the packet statistics. The new statistics
may deviate significantly from the normal profile. In such a case, we must find a
new substitution table in order to match the whole attack packet to the normal
profile. First, we take the normal profile and subtract the frequencies of characters
in the attack vector, decryptor, and existing substitution table. Next, we find a
new substitution table using the adjusted normal profile. If the statistics of the new
substitution table is not significantly different from the old substitution table, we use
the new substitution table for encryption. Otherwise we repeat the above steps.
4.1.4.2 Packet Length based IDS Profile
If IDSB has different profiles for packets of different lengths, as in the case of PAYL, the
substitution phase and padding phase need to use the normal profile corresponding
to the final attack packet size. A target length greater than the length of the original
attack packet (before polymorphic blending) is chosen at first. The encryption step
is then applied and the packet is padded to the target length. If the statistics of the
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resulting attack packet is not very close to the normal profile, a different target length
is chosen and the above process is repeated. Another strategy is to divide the attack
body into multiple small packets and perform the polymorphic blending process for
all of them separately.
4.2 Case Study
To demonstrate that polymorphic blending attacks are feasible and practical, we show
how an attack can use polymorphic blending to evade the anomaly IDS PAYL. PAYL has
been shown to be effective in detecting polymorphic attacks and worms [71, 72]. For
this reason we used PAYL in our case study. We used the 2-gram version in addition
to the 1-gram version to evaluate how polymorphic blending attack is affected when
an IDS uses a more comprehensive model.
4.2.1 Notations
Table 3: Notations
U Set of all possible distinct alphabets
N Set of all distinct alphabets in the normal traffic




w Original attack body
ŵ Substituted attack body before padding
ẃ Substituted attack body after padding
‖s‖ Length of a string s
f(x) Probability of x in normal traffic
f̂(x) Probability of x in ŵ
g(y) Probability of y in attack body w
TN Set of all tuples present in the traffic
TM Set of all tuples present in the attack
S : M 7→ N Mapping from M to N
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4.2.2 PAYL
PAYL uses n-gram (or equivalently q-gram) analysis by recording the frequency distri-
bution of n-grams in the payload of a packet. A sliding window of width n is used to
record the number of occurrences of all the n-grams present in the payload. A sepa-
rate model is generated for each packet length. These models are clustered together
at the end of the training to reduce the number of models. Furthermore, the length
of a packet is also monitored for anomalies. Thus a packet with an unseen or very low
frequency length is flagged as an anomaly. {f(xi), σ(xi)} represents the PAYL model
of normal traffic, where xi is the ith gram, which is a character in 1-gram PAYL, and
a tuple in 2-gram PAYL. f(xi) is the average relative frequency of xi in the normal
traffic, and σ(xi) is the standard deviation of xi in the normal traffic. The anomaly




(f̊(xi)− f(xi))/(σ(xi) + α) (9)
Here, P is the monitored packet, f̊(xi) is the relative frequency of the ith gram xi in
P , and α is a smoothing factor used to prevent division by zero. For convenience we
will use the term frequency to denote relative frequency.
We evaluated our polymorphic blending attack with the first version of PAYL as
described in [71]. Wang et al. [72] proposed some improvements on PAYL in their
recent version. We believe that our attack still works for this new version of PAYL.
The main improvement of the new version is to use multiple centroids for a given
packet length, so that a low false positive rate can be achieved using a relatively
low anomaly threshold. In this case, our polymorphic blending attack has to use the
same learning algorithm as the new version of PAYL. Furthermore, more normal traffic
needs to be used to learn an artificial profile that is close to the actual normal profile.
Thus, the effect is that our attack may take a little more time. The new version also
matches ingress suspicious traffic with egress suspicious traffic to find worms. This
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feature does not have any effect on our attack because the attack instances blend in
with normal.
4.2.3 Evading 1-gram
To evade 1-gram PAYL, the frequency of each character in the attack packet should
be close to the average frequency recorded during the learning phase. We substitute
the characters in the attack packet with the characters seen in the normal traffic, and
apply sufficient amount of padding so that the 1-gram frequencies of the resulting
packet match the normal profile very closely. We first present analytical results on the
amount of padding required to match the substituted attack body with the normal
profile perfectly. Then we present a substitution algorithm that uses the padding
criteria to minimize the amount of required padding.
In the following sections, we assume that the normal frequency f(x) has already
been adjusted for the attack vector, the decryptor, and the decoding table (as dis-
cussed in Section 4.1.4.1, these parts need to be accounted for when computing the
frequencies of characters to find a suitable substitution).
4.2.3.1 Padding
Let ŵ and ẃ be the substituted attack body before and after padding, respectively.
Let n be the number of distinct characters in the normal traffic. ‖s‖ denotes the length
of a string s, and λi denotes the number of occurrences of the normal character xi in





Suppose the relative frequency of character xi in the normal traffic and the substituted
attack body is f(xi) and f̂(xi), respectively. Since the final desired frequency of xi
is f(xi), the number of occurrences of xi in the blending packet should be ‖ẃ‖f(xi).
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Thus, λi can be defined using the following equation:
λi = ‖ẃ‖f(xi)− ‖ŵ‖f̂(xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ cn (11)
Equation 11 can be re-written as,
‖ẃ‖ = λi + ‖ŵ‖f̂(xi)
f(xi)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ cn (12)





Unless they are identical, there exists some character xi for which f̂(xi) > f(xi). The
character xi is perhaps “overused” in the substituted attack body. It is trivial to see
that we need to pad all the characters except the one that is most overused. Let xk
be the character that has highest overuse and δ be the degree of overuse. That is,
δ = δk = maxi{δi}, where δi =
f̂(xi)
f(xi)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ cn (13)
Since no padding is required for character xk, λk = 0. Putting this value in Equation
(12) we get:
‖ẃ‖ = 0 + ‖ŵ‖f̂(xk)
f(xk)
= δ‖ŵ‖ (14)
The amount of padding required for each character xi can be calculated by substitut-
ing the value of ‖ẃ‖ in Equation (11):
λi = ‖ŵ‖(δf(xi)− f̂(xi)) (15)
Thus, using the padding defined by the above equation, we can match the final attack
packet perfectly to the normal frequency f(x). Furthermore, the amount of padding
required by the above equation is the minimum amount that is needed to match the
normal profile exactly. Please refer to Appendix B.1 for the proof.
4.2.3.2 Substitution
The analysis in Section 4.2.3.1 shows that the amount of padding can be minimized
by minimizing δ, which is max( f̂(xi)
f(xi)
). This in turn means that the objective of the
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substitution process is to minimize the resulting δ. There are two possible cases for
substitution. The first is when the number of distinct characters present in the attack
body (cm) is less than or equal to the number of distinct characters present in the
normal traffic (cn), i.e. cm ≤ cn. In this case we can perform single-byte encoding,
either one-to-one or one-to-many. If cm > cn, we need to use multi-byte encoding.
4.2.3.2.1 Case: cm ≤ cn We suggest a greedy algorithm to generate a one-to-
many mapping from the attack characters to the normal characters that provides an
acceptable solution and is computationally efficient. Our algorithm tries to minimize
the ratio δ locally for each substitution assignment.
Let xi represents a normal character and yj represent an attack character. Let
f(xi) be the frequency of character xi in normal traffic and g(yj) be the frequency of
character yj in the attack body. Let S(yj) be the set of normal characters to which
yj is mapped. Let t̂f(yj) = Σxi∈S(yj)f(xi). The probability that yj is substituted by
xi, xi ∈ S(yj), during substitution is f(xi)t̂f(yj) . Thus, the number of occurrences of xi
in the substituted attack body is
f(xi)×g(yj)
t̂f(yj)






. Our greedy algorithm tries to minimize this ratio δi locally. The substitution
algorithm is as follows.
Sort the normal character frequency f(x) and the attack character frequency g(y)
in descending order. For the first cm characters, map yi to xi and set S(yi) = {xi}
and t̂f(yi) = f(xi),∀1 ≤ i ≤ cm. For the (cm + 1)th normal character, xcm+1, find
an attack character (yj) with maximum ratio of
g(yj)
t̂f(yj)
. Assign xcm+1 to yj and set
S(yj) = {xcm+1} ∪ S(yj) and t̂f(yj) = t̂f(yj) + f(xcm+1). This is performed for each
of the remaining characters until we reach the end of the frequency list f(x). While





Consider an example where f(a, b, c) = {0.3, 0.4, 0.3}, attack body w = qpqppqpq,
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and g(p, q) = {0.5, 0.5}. According to the above algorithm, initially, b and a are




we assign c to q. Thus, p will be substituted by b and q will be substituted by a with
probability 0.5 and by c with probability 0.5. Thus, the attack after substitution can
be ŵ = cbabbcba.
In our experiments, we used a simple one-to-one mapping where characters with
the highest frequencies in the attack packet are mapped to characters with the highest
frequencies in normal traffic. This simple mapping is shown to be sufficient for the
blending purpose.
4.2.3.2.2 Case: cm > cn We suggest a heuristic based on Huffman encoding
scheme to obtain a small attack size after encoding. Given the frequency distribution
of the characters in the attack body being encoded, Huffman encoding provides a
minimum length packet after encoding. The weights of the nodes in Huffman tree
is the sum of the relative frequencies of all its descendant leaf nodes. The weight of
a leaf node is the frequency of a given character in the attack body. Every edge in
the tree is assigned to a character from the normal profile. In the original Huffman
coding the edges of the Huffman tree are labeled randomly. Random labeling of the
edges may give us a very large value of δ. We developed a heuristic to assign labels to
edges of Huffman tree to find a mapping that gives us a very small δ. Before stating
the heuristic, we present the problem of optimally assigning the labels to the edges
in Huffman tree:
Given a Huffman tree, assign labels l(v) ∈ N to the vertices v in the tree, such
that after substitution, δ = max( f̂(x)
f(x)
),∀x ∈ N , is minimum. The constraint on the
label l(v) is that if parent(v1) = parent(v2), then l(v1) 6= l(v2).
We propose a greedy algorithm to find an approximate solution for the above
problem. First sort the vertices in descending order of their weight and initialize the
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capacity of each character cap(xi) = f(xi),∀xi ∈ N . Then starting from the leftmost
unlabeled vertex vj, find a character xi with the maximum cap(xi) and that is not
assigned to any of the direct siblings of vj. Assign xi to vj and reduce the capacity of
xi by the weight of the vertex. Repeat until all the vertices are assigned. The labels
generated by the above algorithm are used for the substitution process. An example







0.15 0.25 0.25 0.35
baa
Figure 15: 1-gram multibyte encoding. The frequency of the normal character is
f(a, b) = {0.5, 0.5}. Sorted weights of the nodes are {0.6, 0.4, 0.35, 0.25, 0.25, 0.15}.





Figure 16: 2-gram multibyte encoding. e0 = da, e1 = bc. w = 01101010. ŵ =
bdabcbcbdabcbdabcbda
4.2.4 Evading 2-gram
The 1-gram PAYL model assumes that the bytes occurring in the stream are indepen-
dent. It does not try to capture any information of byte sequencing of the normal
traffic. The 2-gram model on the other hand can capture some byte sequencing infor-
mation. It records the frequencies of all the 2-grams present in the normal traffic. It is
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easy to see that by matching 2-grams we are inherently performing 1-gram matching
as well.
For 2-gram, the polymorphic blending process needs to match the frequencies of
not only all the characters but also all the tuples. Similar to 1-gram substitution,
one can either use single-byte encoding or multi-byte encoding for substitution. For
single-byte encoding, the goal is to find a one-to-one or one-to-many mapping that
ensures that all the tuples in the substituted attack body are also present in normal
profile. In Appendix B.2, we show that this is NP-complete for the general case
by reducing the well known sub-graph isomorphism problem [12] to the mapping
problem. Unlike single-byte encoding, it is possible for an attacker to find a multi-
byte encoding scheme that produces only valid 2-grams. Here, we present a viable
multi-byte encoding scheme.
4.2.4.1 Multi-byte Encoding
A 2-gram normal profile can be viewed as a Moore machine (FSM) which has a state
for each character in N . Every state is a start state and end state. A transition from
state v1 to state v2 exists if and only if 2-gram v1v2 exists in normal profile. This
FSM represents the language accepted by the IDS with given 2-gram profile. Strings
generated by the FSM contain only normal 2-grams. Characters in an attack body
can be mapped to paths in this FSM. For example, suppose the state machine has two
cycles reachable from each other. e1 and e2 be two edges such that e1 is present only
in the first cycle and e2 is present only in the second cycle. Given a bit representation
of the attack body, we can encode 0 using e0 and 1 using e1. We can generate any
bit string represented using these two tuples interleaved by other non-informative
characters present in the cycles and in the paths between two cycles. Figure 16 shows
an example of such an encoding scheme. Such an encoded attack string will have a
very large size. We use it to show the existence of an encoding scheme that is able
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to match the normal 2-grams. We can generate a more efficient encoding scheme by
using the entropy measure of transitions at each state. The complete details of such
an encoding scheme are not addressed in this paper. The authors suggest readers to
refer to coding theory for more on entropy based encoding.
4.2.4.2 Approximate Single-Byte Encoding
As discussed above, the problem of finding a single-byte substitution is hard for 2-
gram. On the other hand, multi-byte encoding may increase the size of the attack
packets considerably. We can use a simple approximation algorithm to find a good
one-to-one substitution. The algorithm performs single byte substitution in such a
way that tuples with high frequencies in the attack packet are greedily matched with
tuples with high frequencies in normal traffic.
The details of the algorithm are as follows. First, sort the normal tuple frequencies
f(xi,j) and the attack tuple frequencies g(yi,j) in descending order. Initially, all tuples
in the list f(xi,j) are marked unused and the substitution table is cleared. The
frequency list g(y) is traversed from the top. For every tuple yi,j in the sorted attack
tuple list, the list f(x) is traversed from the beginning to find an unmarked tuple
xi′,j′ so that substituting yi with xi′ and yj with xj′ does not violate any mappings
that were already made. The tuple xi′,j′ is marked and the substitution table is
updated. The above algorithm is fast and provides consistent reversible matching.
The algorithm does not guarantee to provide the best substitution, i.e., the closest
distance to the target frequency distribution.
4.2.4.3 Padding
We introduce an efficient padding algorithm that does not provide minimal padding
but tries to match the target distribution in a greedy manner. Let df (xi,j) be the
difference between the frequency of tuple xi,j in the normal profile and the substituted
attack body. Find a tuple xk,l from the list of normal tuples that starts with the last
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padded character (xk) and that has the highest df (xk,m),∀1 ≤ m ≤ 256. The second
character of the tuple, xl, is padded to the end of the packet and df (xk,l) is reduced.
This step is repeated until the blending attack size reaches a desired length.
4.2.5 Complexity of Blending Attacks
We now summarize the methods provided above and analyze the hardness of a poly-
morphic blending attack while keeping the design goals (Section 4.1.2.2) in mind. For
1-gram blending, although finding a substitution that minimizes the padding seems
to be a hard-problem and may take exponential time, we have proposed greedy algo-
rithms that find a good substitution that require small amount of padding to perfectly
match the normal byte frequency. For 2-gram blending, finding a single-byte substi-
tution that ensures only normal tuples after substitution is shown to be NP-hard (see
the proof in Appendix B.2). An approximation algorithm can be used to efficiently
compute a substitution that may introduce a few invalid tuples. A multibyte encoding
scheme can achieve a very good match with no invalid tuples at the expense of very
large attack sizes. An attacker has to therefore consider several trade-offs between the
degree of matching, attack size, and time complexity to mount successful blending
attacks.
4.2.6 Experiments
In our evaluation, we first established a baseline performance by sending polymorphic
instances (generated using the CLET polymorphic engine) of the attack to PAYL and
verified that all of the instances were detected by the IDS as anomalies. Then, without
changing the configuration of PAYL, we used our polymorphic blending techniques to
generate attack instances to see how well they can evade the IDS.
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4.2.6.1 Experiment Setup
4.2.6.1.1 Attack Vector We chose an attack that targets a vulnerability in Win-
dows Media Services (MS03-022). The attack vector we selected exploits a problem
with the logging ISAPI extension that handles incoming client requests. It is based
on the implementation by firew0rker [18]. The size of the attack vector is 99 bytes
and is required to be present at the start of the HTTP request. The attack needs to
send approximately 10KB of data to cause the buffer overflow and compromise the
system. Our attack body opens a TCP client socket to an IP address and sends system
registry files. The size of the unencrypted attack body is 558 bytes and contains 109
different characters. During the blending process, we divided our attack into several
packets. If our final blending attack after padding does not add up to 10KB, we just
send some normal packets as a part of the attack to cause the buffer overflow. The
decryptor was divided into multiple sections and distributed among different packets.




























Figure 17: Packet length distribution
4.2.6.1.2 Dataset We collected around 7 days of HTTP traffic (4.7M packets) com-





























Number of packets (in thousands)
1-gram
2-gram
Figure 18: Observed unique 1-grams and 2-grams





Num. of Pkts 16,490 540 1,781
One Grams 106 90 128
Two Grams 4,325 3,791 3,903
Attack Training
Num. of Pkts 2,168 82 249
One Grams 89 86 86
Two Grams 2,847 2,012 2,196
Snort, to verify that this data contains no known attack. We removed all the packets
with no TCP payload. We used around 4.3M packets (1.9GB) for IDS training to
obtain the IDS normal profiles. A separate profile was created for each TCP payload
length (or simply packet length). The full payload section of each packet was used
to compute the profiles. The last day of the HTTP traffic was made available to the
attacker to learn the artificial profile. We also used cross-validation, i.e., randomly
picking one of the 7 days for attack training and the rest for IDS training, to verify
the results of our experiments.
The packet length distributions in the IDS training dataset and the attack training
dataset are shown in Figure 17. Among this packet lengths, we chose three different
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lengths to implement the blending attack, namely 418, 730 and 1460. These packets
lengths are large enough to accommodate the attack data into a small number of
packets. These lengths also occurred frequently in the training dataset. A separate
artificial profile was created for each packet length using the attack training data of
the same packet length. Thus, we generated three 1-gram models and three 2-gram
models for different packet lengths. Table 4 shows the details of the datasets used
for the evaluation. The numbers of unique 1-grams and 2-grams in the data are also
shown in the table.
4.2.7 Results
Training time of 1-gram and 2-gram PAYL: We performed experiments on the
training time required to learn the profiles used by PAYL. Figure 18 shows the numbers
of unique 1-grams and 2-grams observed in HTTP traffic stream. Since the numbers of
observed 1-gram and 2-gram continue to increase as new packets arrive in the stream,
the training of profiles for 1-gram and 2-gram takes a long time to converge. We
trained our IDS model using all of the available IDS training data.
Traditional polymorphic attacks: To the best of our knowledge, CLET [13]
is the only publicly available tool that implements evasion techniques against byte
frequency-based anomaly IDS. For this reason we used CLET as our baseline. As
mentioned in Section 2.2, given an attack CLET adds padding bytes in the payload
to make the byte frequency distribution of the attack close to the normal traffic.
However, CLET does not apply any byte substitution technique (see Section 4.2.3.2).
Further, CLET does not address the evasion of 2-gram PAYL explicitly. We also
generated polymorphic attacks using other well known tools (e.g., ADMutate [32]),
and verified that they are less effective than CLET in evading PAYL.
We generated multiple polymorphic instances of our attack body using CLET and
tested them against PAYL. Each attack instance contained one or more attack packets
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of given length. Different amount of bytes were crammed (padded) to obtain the
desired attack size. Attack training data was used to generate spectral files used for
cramming by the CLET engine. A polymorphic attack instance will evade an IDS
model if and only if all the attack packets corresponding to the attack instance are
able to evade the IDS. Thus, the anomaly score of an attack instance was calculated
as the highest of all the anomaly scores (Equation 9) obtained by the attack packets
corresponding to the attack instance. Table 5 shows the anomaly threshold setting
of different PAYL models that result in the detection of all the attack instances. The
anomaly thresholds were calculated as the minimum anomaly score over all the attack
instances. Using the given thresholds, both 1-gram and 2-gram PAYL were successful
in detecting all the instances of the attack. Having established this “baseline” per-
formance, we would like to show that our blending attacks can evade PAYL even if a
lower threshold is used.
Table 5: IDS anomaly threshold setting that detects all the polymorphic attacks
sent by the CLET engine




Table 6: Number of packets required for the convergence of attacker’s training





We used a simple convergence technique, similar to PAYL, to stop the training of the
artificial profile. At every certain interval (convergence check interval) we check if the

















































Figure 19: Anomaly score of Artificial Profile
interval is smaller than a certain threshold (convergence threshold). It stops training if
the distance is smaller than the threshold. We set the convergence threshold (= 0.05)
to be the same as the original implementation of PAYL. The artificial profile does
not have to become very stable or match the normal profile perfectly because some
deviation from the normal profile can be tolerated. To reduce the training time we set
the convergence check interval to 2 packets. Thus, if we see two consecutive packets
of a given length that are close to the learned profile, we stop training. Table 6 shows
the number of packets required to converge the artificial profile of different packet
lengths. As expected, the artificial profile converges very fast. The 1-gram profile
converges faster than the 2-gram profile for the same packet length. We show that
a small number of packets are enough to create an effective polymorphic blending
attack. In practice, the attacker can use more learning data to create a better profile.
Figure 19 shows the anomaly score of the artificial normal profile, as calculated
by the IDS normal profile, versus the number of attack training packets used to
learn the artificial profile. As the number of attack training packets increases, the
anomaly score of artificial normal profile decreases, which means that the artificial
profile trained using more packets is a better estimation of the PAYL normal profile.
The score needs to be less than the anomaly threshold of PAYL for the blending attack
packets to have a realistic chance of evading PAYL. For all attack training sizes shown
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in Figure 19, the score is well under the threshold (Table 5) used to configure PAYL
to detect all the traditional (without blending) polymorphic attack instances.
4.2.7.2 Blending Attacks for 1-gram and 2-gram PAYL
For each packet length, we generated both the 1-gram and 2-gram PAYL normal profiles
using the entire IDS training dataset (i.e., the first 14 days of HTTP traffic). For each
packet length, the 1-gram and 2-gram artificial normal models were learned using a
fraction of the attack training dataset. The learning stops at the point the models
converge, as shown in Table 6.
We used the one-to-one single-byte substitution technique discussed in Section
4.2.3.2.1 for constructing the blending attack against 1-gram PAYL, and the single
byte encoding scheme discussed in Section 4.2.4.2 for the blending attack against
2-gram PAYL. Two sets of blending experiments were performed. In the first set of
experiments, the substituted attack body was divided into multiple packets and each
packet was padded separately to match the normal profile. A single decoding table
is required to decode the whole attack flow. In the second set of experiments, the
attack body was first divided into a given number of packets. Each of the attack
body sections were substituted using one-to-one single byte substitution and then
padded to match the normal frequency. Individually substituting the attack body
for each packet allowed us to match the statistical profile of the substituted attack
body closer to the normal profile. But it requires a separate decoding table for
each packet, thus reducing the padding space considerably. For convenience, we call
the first set of experiments global substitution, and the second local substitution. If
m > n for any of the above experiments, we simply substituted the low frequency
attack characters using non-existing characters in the normal. This increased the
error in blending attack but reduced the complexity of the blending attack algorithm.





















































(b) 1-gram Blending Packet for packet
length 1460
Figure 20: Comparison of frequency distribution of normal profile and attack packet
present in the HTTP traffic. The byte frequency distribution of the original attack
instance is very different from the normal profile because the normal data has mainly
printable ASCII characters whereas the attack payload has many characters that are
unprintable. Thus, this was easily detected by both 1-gram and 2-gram IDS models.
The attack was substituted and padded to obtain a single packet of length 1460. As
shown in Figure 20(b), the frequency distribution of attack payload after substitution
and padding becomes almost identical to the PAYL normal profile. This demonstrates
























































Figure 21: Anomaly score of the blending attack packets (with local substitution)
for artificial profile and IDS profile























































Figure 22: Anomaly score of the blending attack packets (with global substitution)
for artificial profile and IDS profile
the attack packets with the artificial profile and evade PAYL. The experiments were
performed with the number of attack packets ranging from 1 to 12. We checked the
anomaly score of each attack packet as calculated by both the artificial profile and the
IDS profile. Similar to the anomaly score of attack instances generated by CLET, the
anomaly score of a blending attack instance was calculated as the highest of all the
scores obtained by the attack packets corresponding to the blending attack instance.
Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the anomaly scores of blending attacks with local
substitution and global substitution, respectively. For each attack flow, we show the
score of the packet with the highest score. It is evident that if the attack is divided
into more packets, it matches the profile more closely. The reason is that if the
attack body is divided into multiple fragments, for each packet there is more padding
space available to match the profile. Also, local substitution works better than global
substitution scheme for all cases except for 2-gram blending for packet length 418.
Since our substitution table contains only normal 1-grams but may contain foreign
2-grams, a large substitution table may produce a large error for the 2-gram model.
Considering that small packets have small padding space to reduce the error caused
by the substitution table, having an individual substitution table in each packet can
cause large error.
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Although the score of the blending attack as calculated by the IDS model is greater
than the score calculated by the artificial normal profile, it is still much lower than
the anomaly threshold set for the detection of traditional polymorphic attacks.
Thus, our experiment clearly shows that unlike traditional polymorphic attacks,
our blending attack is very effective in evading 1-gram and 2-gram PAYL for all the
packet lengths and number of attack packets.
Table 7: Anomaly thresholds for different false positive rates in IDS models. Brack-
eted entries are the the numbers of packets required to evade the IDS using the local
and global substitution scheme, respectively.
False Positive 418 730 1460
1-gram 2-gram 1-gram 2-gram 1-gram 2-gram
0.1 61.07 (17,-) 373.4 (-,12) 63.70 (5,7) 467.6 (5,5) 74.50 (3,3) 447.7 (2,2)
0.01 78.61 (12,15) 456.9 (22,8) 143.6 (2,3) 625.5 (3,3) 81.98 (3,3) 531.0 (2,2)
0.001 125.5 (5,7) 561.8 (7,6) 164.6 (2,3) 670.5 (3,3) 239.2 (1,1) 931.9 (1,1)
0.0001 166.8 (5,5) 582.6 (7,5) 244.5 (2,2) 805.0 (2,2) 243.4 (1,1) 935.0 (1,1)
4.2.7.3 Impact of IDS False Positive Rate
We also studied the effect of false positive rates on the detection of blending attacks.
Anomaly threshold for a given false positive rate (fp) is set such that only fp fraction
of normal data has anomaly score higher than the anomaly threshold. The anomaly
thresholds for different false positive rates are shown in Table 4.2.7.2. The number of
attack packets required to evade the IDS successfully for a given threshold is shown
in the parenthesis. As we increase the false positive rate, we need to divide the attack
into more packets to keep the score below the anomaly threshold. Thus, keeping a
high false positive rate may increase the size of the blending attack. From the table
we can infer that even if the IDS keeps its false positive rate high to detect more
attacks, blending attack can still easily evade it using an attack size as small as 3,650,
i.e. five packets of length 730.
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Since 2-gram PAYL records some sequence information along with byte frequencies,
it seems to be a good representation of normal traffic. In our experiments we found
that 2-gram PAYL consistently produces higher anomaly score than 1-gram PAYL for
all attack packet lengths. But at the same time, the 2-gram IDS needs to set very
high anomaly thresholds to avoid high false positive rates. Thus, in practice, the
2-gram PAYL is actually only marginally more effective than the 1-gram version in
detecting attacks.
Blending attacks can be successfully launched on both 1-gram and 2-gram models.
Larger packet lengths are more suitable for blending attacks. With few exceptions,
the local substitution scheme works better than the global substitution scheme. The
2-gram model provides only marginal advantage over the 1-gram model in detecting
blending attacks but requires huge space to store the model. Thus, the 2-gram model
may not be a better choice over the 1-gram model.
4.3 A Formal Framework
In Section 4.1 & 4.2, we presented basic concepts behind polymorphic blending at-
tacks. The principal observation is that a network IDS, monitoring high-speed and
high-volume traffic, typically uses simple statistical features instead of complex struc-
tural or semantic information to model the normal traffic. An attacker can exploit
this simplicity or limitation to devise attacks capable of evading the IDS. However,
the blending techniques presented earlier are not general enough. They are based on
some heuristics which work well for PAYL but not necessarily other anomaly detection
systems. We would like to develop techniques which can be used to generate PBAs
for a wide range on anomaly IDSs.
In this section, we study the following problem: given an anomaly detection system
and an attack, can one automatically generate PBA instances? Our approach is
to develop a formal framework that starts with the models for IDSs and different
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sections of a polymorphic attack. Based on these models, we can then reason about
the complexity of the problem of generating a PBA, and develop general algorithms
for solving the problem. We first discuss the class of IDS targeted by polymorphic
blending attacks present in this section. We also present models for different attack
sections. Then we discuss the structure of the polymorphic blending attack and
detailed steps used to generate polymorphic blending attack. Based on the models,
we reason the complexity of matching different attack sections with the normal model.
4.3.1 Modeling Anomaly Detection Systems
Earlier, we considered a class of anomaly detection systems that use only simple byte
statistics of the normal traffic. We would like to generalize the concept of polymorphic
blending attack to include a wide range of anomaly detection systems that use other
structural information of the normal traffic.
Since a polymorphic attack typically mutates only the packet payload, we limit
our scope to payload-based anomaly detection systems. These systems record the
statistics and structure of the bytes preset in the normal network traffic packets. Such
anomaly IDS proposed by researchers include PAYL [71], NETAD[35], LERAD [36],
service-specific IDS [30], and structure based detection of Web attacks by Kruegel
et al. [31]. We observe that these IDS can be represented as either Finite State
Automaton (FSA) or equivalently stochastic Finite State Automaton (sFSA). sFSA
is similar to FSA and has a probability assigned to all the transitions in the FSA.
4.3.1.1 PAYL
PAYL records the average frequency of different unique n-grams that appear in normal
traffic packets. An n-gram model can be described using an sFSA where each state
represents the unique (n − 1)-gram corresponding to the last (n − 1) bytes in the
packet. A transition from state A(a0a1 · · · an−2) to state A′(a1a2 · · · an−1) exists if
and only if n-gram (a0a1....an−2an−1) is present in the normal traffic. The probability
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of a transition is equal to the probability of the corresponding n-gram in the normal
traffic. Every state is a start state and every state is an accept/end state. For example,
1-gram model can be represented using a single state sFSA: for every unique byte in
the normal traffic, there exists a transition from the state to itself; and the probability
of the transition is the same as the frequency of the byte in normal traffic.
4.3.1.2 Anagram
Anagram [70] is an another payload based network anomaly detector based on n-gram
matching. Anagram records all the n-grams which are commonly present in normal
traffic. However unlike PAYL, Anagram does not record the frequency of n-gram.
Also, Anagram uses higher value of n (4 ≤ n ≤ 7) than PAYL (n = 1or2). An FSA
can be used to represent all the n-grams stored by Anagram. Each state represents
the unique (n−1)-gram present in the packet. A transition from state A(a0a1 · · · an−2)
to state A′(a1a2 · · · an−1) exists if and only if n-gram (a0a1....an−2an−1)is present in
the Anagram model.
4.3.1.3 NETAD and LERAD
Mahoney et al. presented a series of anomaly IDSs that use some network level data
along with some payload data to detect intrusions. These systems use attributes
such as bytes or words present at specific positions in the payload. An applica-
tion layer LERAD rule is of the form (if, word1 = x1, · · · , wordm−1 = xm−1 then
wordm ∈ {x1,m, · · · , xn,m}). Such a rule can be seen as regular grammar of the form
(x1{spaces}x2 · · ·xm−1{spaces}{x1,m| · · · |xn,m}). Multiple rules can be combined us-
ing the ‘&’ term to obtain a single regular grammar.
4.3.1.4 Structure-Based Systems
Kruegel et al. presented an IDS for Web services. A Web traffic packet is divided into
attributes and different attributes are recorded using different byte characteristics,
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including: attribute length, byte frequency, byte structure using sFSA, and token
set. As in PAYL, byte frequency can be represented using a sFSA with one state.
Token set (T = {t1, · · · , tn}) can be seen as a regular grammar of the form (t1| · · · |tn).
Models of the different attributes can be combined to form a single sFSA. The length
constraint on an attribute is handled separately during the blending attack generation.
In summary, the above anomaly detection systems can be represented using a
(s)FSA. For convenience, the (s)FSA corresponding to an IDS is called (s)FSAids.
4.3.1.5 Distance Calculation
Along with an (s)FSA model, an anomaly detection system uses a classifier to deter-
mine if an observed packet matches the (s)FSA or not. First the IDS finds a path
taken by the monitored packet in the normal (s)FSA. For an FSA IDS, we calculate
the number of times each error transition is covered by the monitored packet. For
an sFSA IDS, we calculate the frequency with which each transition is taken in the
sFSA. The frequency of each transition in the path is then used as a feature by the
classifier to determine the distance between the monitored packet and the normal
profile.
This distance metric should be small for packets that are accepted by the FSA
with few errors and vice versa. In case of sFSA, the distance should be small if for all
the transitions, the number of times the transition is taken in the monitored packet is
proportional to the transition probability. If the distance is smaller than a threshold,
the packet is considered normal. Otherwise, the packet is considered anomalous.
The IDSs discussed above use a simple distance metric for the classifier. For
an FSA IDS, the distance metric is defined using a weighted sum of all the error
transitions taken by the monitored data.
There are several distance metrics that are used for sFSA IDS. A typical IDS
distance metric considered in this framework is weighted L1 distance metric. The
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distance between an sFSAids and a monitored packet is defined as in equation 16.









where, pt is the probability of transition t, lt is the number of times transition t is
taken in the monitored packet and l is the length of the path taken by the monitored
packet.
4.3.1.6 An Example
We have shown that a wide range of intrusion detection systems that use byte statis-
tics and structure of a normal packet can be represented using either an FSA or an
sFSA. One main reason for using an FSA (or equivalently, regular expression) is that
determining whether a string is generated by an FSA is very fast, and thus the IDS
can be used to monitor high speed networks.
In this work, we assume that the attacker is trying to evade an IDS that can be
represented using either an FSA or sFSA. Figure 23 shows a simple example of a
sFSA IDS. The IDS accepts strings containing only following tuples: ab, ba, and bb.
We use this simple IDS as a running example throughout this section.







where nc1c2 denotes the number of times transition c1 to c2 is taken by the input
string, l is the length of the string, and pc1c2 is the probability of transition c1 to c2
in the sFSA.
4.3.2 Polymorphic Attacks Section Models
Now we model different attack sections of a polymorphic attack: Attack Vector;




















00h⊕ k1 01h⊕ k2 00h⊕ k1 00h⊕ k2
Encrypted Attack Code
Figure 24: Simple attack example. Attack code is 4 byte string with NUL and SOH
ASCII characters.
4.3.2.1 Attack Vector
Multiple techniques exist to mutate an attack vector. These mutation techniques
modify the network protocol data along with the application layer data, while en-
suring that the modified attack instance will still compromise the system. Some of
the common techniques are multiple protocol rounds, divergence from protocol spec-
ification, SSL null record insertion, TCP fragmentation, HTTP padding, and shellcode
polymorphism.
Regular grammars or a state-based machines have been commonly used by the
developers of misuse detection systems to write attack signatures. Several of these
signatures are used to detect malicious payload. These signatures primarily represent
parts of attack vectors. Snort uses a regular expression to define an attack. NETSTAT
uses a state machine to represent attack events. Several other misuse IDSs uses an
equivalent of regular expression for attack specification.
Recently, Shai et al proposed a grammar based approach (GARD) to represent all
the possible mutations of an attack. The attack was divided into three phase: attack
pre-condition, attack execution, and attack confirmation. Each of these phases were
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represented using a state automaton. Also, in their previous work (AGENT) Shai et
al modeled attacks using a regular grammar generated using a set of inference rules.
In this framework, we consider attack vectors that can be represented using an
FSA. For convenience, the FSA corresponding to an attack vector is called FSAav.
4.3.2.2 Polymorphic Decryptor
Some of the shell-code obfuscation techniques used by attackers to generate polymor-
phic decryptors are:
• Garbage insertion: Operations which does not have any effect on the seman-
tics of the decryptor. For example, modifying unused registers and memory
locations.
• Instruction reordering: Re-ordering instructions that do not depend on each
other.
• Equivalent code substitution: Substituting an instruction or a set of instructions
with another set of instructions with same functionality.
• Register shuffling: Using a different register to store a given variable.
Most of the shell code obfuscation techniques are context-aware operations and
thus the set of all obfuscated code cannot be represented sufficiently using context-
free languages. Thus, we need a context-sensitive language to represent polymorphic
decryptor code.
4.3.2.3 Attack Code
Similar to polymorphic decryptor, attack code can also be mutated using different
shell-code obfuscation techniques presented in Section 4.3.2.2. Thus, the language
representing attack code also needs to be context sensitive.
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DecryptorAttack Vector Encrypted Attack Code PaddingKey
Figure 25: Position of different attack section in attack.
4.3.2.4 Key
Attacker can theoretically encrypt an attack code using any encryption key without
affecting the working of the attack. Thus, the language representing a key is simply
all the possible strings of length k, where k is the length of the key. In other words,
key is Σk, where Σ is the set of all characters.
4.3.2.5 Padding
Similar to key, an attacker can pad an attack packet with any random data. There-
fore, the language representing the padding is Sigmalp , where lp is the length of the
padding.
4.3.3 Polymorphic Blending Attack
As discussed earliler, a polymorphic blending attack contains up to five sections. An
attack vector is required to be present in all the attacks. An attack code is required if
adversary wants to execute an arbitrary code at victim. A polymorphic decryptor and
a decryption table need to be present if adversary decides to encrypt the shell-code.
Padding is optional and may help adversary in closely matching the normal profile.
The positioning of each attack section in an attack may depend on the semantics
of the attack, which is decided by the adversary when designing the attack. In this
discussion, we assume that all the five sections are present in the attack packet and
they are positioned as showed in Figure 25. However, the discussion on generating
polymorphic blending attack and its complexity should hold for other positioning
of the sections. The discussion also applies even if some of the attack sections are
missing.
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4.3.3.1 Polymorphic Blending Attack Steps
Lets assume that an attacker has learned the (s)FSA corresponding to the (artificial)
normal profile of the targeted IDS. The next step is to design an attack packet that
can be accepted by the (s)FSA.
To generate a polymorphic blending attack, adversary needs to generate different
attack sections that matches the normal profile. First adversary decides the position-
ing of each attack section in the attack. Then each attack section is generated in a
separate step. Each section is matched to the normal profile in the same order as the
section is positioned in the attack. We use the positioning shown in Figure 25 for our
polymorphic blending attack.
First we generate a suitable attack vector. The choice of attack vector depends
on the vulnerability on the victim side. To stay undetected, attack vector should be
small and should also look like normal. For an FSA IDS, the attack vector should
traverse the FSA with minimal number of invalid transitions. For an sFSA IDS,
in addition being taking valid transitions, the attack vector should also match the
transition probabilities.
Then we adjust the (s)FSA for what have been already matched by the attack
vector. First, we identify the path taken by the attack vector in the (s)FSA. If
there does not exist such a complete path (e.g., some transitions are not in the
(s)FSA), there will be an error matching the attack vector with the normal profile.
The start state of the (s)FSA is set to the end state of the path traversed by the
attack vector. For an sFSA IDS, the transition probabilities of each transition is also
adjusted according to the number of times the transition was taken in the attack
vector.
The next step is to generate a polymorphic decryptor. Similar to the attack vector,
the polymorphic decryptor should also match the adjusted (s)FSA. After generating
the polymorphic decryptor, the start state of the (s)FSA is adjusted for the generated
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decryptor. In case of an sFSA, the transition probabilities of the sFSA is also adjusted.
The next step is to generate an attack code. The choice of the attack code depends
on what adversary wants to do after she has compromised the system. After deciding
on the attack code, adversary needs to determine an encryption key to encrypt the
attack code. The requirement on the encryption key is that the encrypted attack
code and the decryption key should be accepted by the adjusted (s)FSA (i.e., there
exists a corresponding path). For a sFSA, an additional requirement is to also match
the transitions probabilities.
The final step is to pad the attack packet to get a desired packet length. For an
sFSA IDS, padding can be used to match the final attack packet even closer to the
normal profile.
We use a simple blending attack (shown in Figure 24) to demonstrate different
concepts presented in the paper. We use an XOR encryption scheme with key length
2 (obviously, the encryption key and the decryption key is the same in an XOR
scheme). The attack vector, decryptor, key, and attack code are concatenated in the
given order to produce an attack packet payload.
For convenience of discussion, we denote the string corresponding to the decryp-
tion key concatenated with the encrypted attack code as Skey ac.
4.4 Formal Analysis
In this section, we discuss the complexity of matching different attack sections with
the normal model. We also present algorithms that can used to match each attack
sections with the normal model.
4.4.1 Attack Vector
Our aim is to generate an attack vector that matches the normal profile. We consider
attack vectors that can be represented using an FSA. We show that for an FSA IDS,
it is easy to generate an attack vector of given length that is accept by the FSA with
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minimum number of errors. But generating an attack vector with minimum distance
to the sFSA IDS is NP-complete problem.
4.4.1.1 FSA IDS
To find a matching attack vector, we need to find a string which is accepted by both
FSAav and FSAids. We find the intersection of FSAav and FSAids, which will also
be an FSA. If the intersection is not empty, adversary can obtain a desired attack
vector by generating a string that is accepted by the intersected FSA. In case the
intersection is empty, following algorithm can be used to find an attack vector string
that is accepted by the IDS with minimum errors.
First, we add all the error states and transitions in the IDS FSA. For all the valid
transitions, the cost of the transition is set to 0. For all the error transitions, the
cost of the transition is set to 1. We call this IDS with error transitions and cost,
augFSAids. Then we compute the intersection of FSAav and augFSAids. We the
intersection FSA, FSAav∩augids. To generate an attack vector of given length lav, we
need to find a minimum cost path of length lav from the start state q0 to an end
state in FSAav∩augids. This problem is very similar to shortest path problem and
can be solved using a polynomial-time algorithm. The algorithm is very similar to
Bellman-Ford algorithm which is used to solve single source shortest path problem.
We maintain two arrays, dq and pq of length lav at each state q of FSAav∩augids.
dq[i] at node q contains the minimum distance from q0 to q using path of length i.
pq[i] contains the previous node in that path. The algorithm contains of lav steps. In
the ith step, algorithm determines the min-cost path of length i from q0 to q, ∀q ∈ Q.
The min-cost path of length i is determined by relaxing every transition in FSAav∩augids.
An edge (q1, q2) is relaxed by testing whether the min-cost distance to state q2 can be
reduced by taking the ith transition of the path through q1. If the min-cost distance
is reduced, the dq2 [i] is updated as dq1 [i − 1] + cost(q1, q2). The pseudo-code of the
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algorithm is given in Appendix B.5.
Once we find a min-cost path of length lav from start state to all the other states,
we choose the final state which has minimum cost path of length lav.
If an adversary wants to generate min-error attack vector, irrespective of the length
of the attack vector, we can use Bellman-Ford algorithm to find min-cost path from
q0 to all the final states. Again, we choose the final state which has minimum cost
path.
4.4.1.2 sFSA IDS
In the case of sFSA IDS, along with matching the transitions, the attack vector should
also match the transition probabilities. The distance between the sFSA and attack
vector is calculated using the distance metric in equation 16. We show that unlike
matching FSA IDS, matching attack vector to sFSA IDS is a hard problem. It is
impractical to try brute force by generating all the possible attack vectors and try
matching them to the sFSA. The brute force approach will take time exponential
to the number of nodes in the FSAav. We prove that generating attack vector that
matches the sFSA within a given error bound is NP-complete.
We formally define the problem of finding an attack vector that is accepted by
the sFSA IDS.
Definition 4.4.1 Given an attack vector FSAav and an IDS sFSAids, the problem
PBAsFSAav is to find a string which is accepted by FSAav and also matches the tran-
sition probabilities of sFSAids within an error bound, ε.
Theorem 4.4.1 Problem PBAsFSAav is NP-complete.
Proof For a problem to be NP-complete, the problem should be in NP and should
be NP-hard.
A problem is in NP if a given solution can be verified for its correctness in poly-
nomial time. Given an attack vector string, we can easily verify in polynomial time
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whether or not the string is accepted by the FSAav. We can also verify if the distance
between the attack vector and the sFSAids is within the error bound. Thus, we can
efficiently verify if the string is a correct solution or not.
To prove that the problem is NP-hard, we reduce a well known NP-complete
problem, namely Hamiltonian cycle problem, to PBAsFSAav . For a given directed
graph G(V, E), we create an FSAav and sFSAids such that solution of PBA
sFSA
av is
equivalent to the Hamiltonian cycle in graph G(V, E).
Let Σ be the set of input characters which contains a character ci for each vertex
vi ∈ V . Suppose w is an arbitrarily big positive integer which is multiple order of
magnitudes greater than ‖V ‖‖E‖. The FSAav is the set of all the substrings of length
2‖V ‖, that is, FSAav = Σ2‖V ‖.
The sFSAids is constructed as follows. For each vertex vi ∈ V , we create two
states qi1 and qi2 . We introduce a transition from state qi1 to state qi2 on input ci
with transition probability of 1
2‖V ‖ and cost w. We denote this kind of transition
as Tv. Also, for each edge (vi, vj) in E, we introduce a transition of type Te from
state qi2 to state qj1 on input cj with transition probability
1
2‖E‖ and cost 1. States
qi1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ ‖V ‖ are both start state and final state. Figure 26 shows construction of
a sFSAids for a sample directed graph. The cost of taking a non-existing transition
in the graph is w. Please note that any path in above sFSAids which consists of only
valid transition will be of form TvTeTvTe · · ·TvTe and corresponding string will be of
form ci1ci2ci2ci3ci3 · · · cilcilcl+1.
Now, we prove that this transformation is indeed a reduction and graph G has
a Hamiltonian cycle if and only if there exists an attack vector which matches the
sFSAids with an error bound of
‖E‖−‖V ‖
‖E‖ .
Suppose, graph G has a Hamiltonian cycle v1v2 · · · v‖V ‖v1. Then we can con-
struct an attack vector c1c2c2c3c3 · · · c‖V ‖c‖V ‖c1. This attack vector takes only the






















Figure 26: Construction of a sFSAids for a given Hamiltonian graph
all type Tv transitions. Thus error contributed by such transitions is zero. For all
type Te transitions (qi2 , qj1) traversed by the attack vector, the error contributed is
given in equation 18. There are ‖V ‖ such Te transitions covered by the attack vector.
Therefore, total error due to such transitions is ‖E‖−‖V ‖
2‖E‖ . For all the valid transitions
(qi2 , qj1) not traversed by the attack vector, the error contributed is given in equa-
tion 19. There are (‖E‖ − ‖V ‖) such Te transitions not covered by the attack vector
and the total error due to such transitions is ‖E‖−‖V ‖
2‖E‖ . Thus, the final error is
‖E‖−‖V ‖
‖E‖
which is precisely the bound.













Conversely, suppose there exists an attack vector of length 2‖V ‖ with error below
‖E‖−‖V ‖
‖E‖ . Since this bound is smaller than w, attack vector takes only valid transitions
in the sFSAids and also takes all the transitions of type Tv exactly once. Thus, attack
vector is of form ci1ci2ci2ci3ci3 · · · ci‖V ‖ci‖V ‖ci1 . In this case, there exists an edge from
each vij to vij+1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ ‖V ‖. Thus, cycle vi1vi2vi3 · · · vi‖V ‖vi1 is a Hamiltonian cycle.
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4.4.1.3 Approximate Solution
In section 4.4.1.2, we showed that the problem of finding an attack vector that matches
the sFSAids is NP-complete. That is, it may take time exponential to the desired
length of the attack vector. Although an attacker may not have any time restrictions,
a polynomial time solution is clearly more desirable. Rather than finding the optimal
solution which tries to match the attack vector as close as possible, an attacker may
simply apply some heuristics that produce an approximate solution using much less
resources (time and memory). We can also reduce the PBAsFSAav problem to some
other domain which has good approximate solvers.
4.4.1.3.1 Greedy Heuristic Greedy algorithms are used widely for finding ap-
proximate solutions. The idea is to make a local optimal decision at each stage. Using
this we hope to get near the global optimal solution. The local decision for PBAsFSAav
problem is made based on minimizing the current error. The greedy algorithm takes
lav stage and at each stage it generates a character in the attack vector.
We start at the start state of both FSAav and sFSAids. We consider all the
transitions from the start state in FSAav that can lead to a final state in total lav
steps. Out of all these transitions we choose one that minimizes the distance between
current generated attack vector string (which is simply the character corresponding
to that transition in FSAav) and sFSAids. Suppose after i − 1 steps, the algorithm
has already generated an attack vector string c1c2 · · · ci−1 and it is at state qi−1 in
FSAav. At ith step, we consider all the transitions from qi−1 that can lead to final
state in next lav − i steps. We choose the transition to state qi that produces ci such
that, c1c2 · · · ci−1ci is at the minimum distance to sFSAids.
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4.4.1.3.2 Reduction A greedy heuristic may not give us a good approximate
solution in many cases because the problem does not exhibit a clear optimal sub-
structure. In such cases, we can reduce the PBAsFSAav problem to Integer Linear
Programming (ILP) problem. ILP is known to be NP-complete, but there exist sev-
eral good heuristics to solve big ILP problems. An ILP problem tries to find the
minimum of a linear cost function over a set of variables. These variables are re-
stricted by a finite number of linear constraints. All the variables in the solution
should be integer.
First, we find an FSAav∩ids that is an intersection of FSAav and sFSAids. For
every state qi
av and qj
ids in FSAav and sFSAids respectively, we have a state qij
in FSAav∩ids. For every transition t(i1, i2)
av and t(j1, j2)
ids in FSAav and sFSAids
respectively, we have a transition t(iij1, i2j2) from state qi1j1 to state qi2j2 in FSAav∩ids.
Now the PBAsFSAav problem is equivalent to finding a string that is accepted by









Now we generate an ILP problem corresponding to a PBAsFSAav problem. For each
transition t(iij1, i2j2) in the FSAav∩ids, we have a variable hiij1,i2j2 which represents
the number of times transition t(iij1, i2j2) is taken in the generated attack vector.
The length of the path can be represented using equation 21.
∑
transition t∈FSAav∩ids
ht = lav (21)
The necessary and sufficient condition for a valid path from start state to a final









ht + errqf =
∑
t∈OUT (qf )
ht + 1, (23)∑
t∈IN(qij)
ht + errqij =
∑
t∈OUT (qij)
ht, ∀qij ∈ FSAav∩ids, qij /∈ {q0, qf} (24)
where IN(v) and OUT (v) is the set of in and out transitions of vertex v, respectively.
q0 and qf is the start state and final state, respectively.
The minimization criteria for the ILP problem which minimizes the distance be-








Solving above ILP for the given minimization criteria provides the desired attack
vector with minimum distance to the sFSAids.
4.4.2 Polymorphic Decryptor
A set of all polymorphic code that can be used to decrypt a given encrypted attack
code can be represented satisfactorily using context sensitive language. Thus the
problem of generating a suitable decryptor that matches the normal profile can be
seen as a problem of finding an intersection of a context sensitive language and an
(s)FSA. Problem related to finding an intersection between a context sensitive lan-
guage and any other language in general is un-tractable. Thus, we cannot find an
appropriate decryptor automatically. In this work, we assume that the decryption
code is generated out of band. This decryption code should preferably be small and
should contain mainly ASCII characters. Adversary can generate the decryptor ei-
ther manually or using a polymorphic code engine. However, the adversary cannot
guarantee that generate decryptor matches optimally to the (s)FSA IDS.
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4.4.3 Padding
As discussed in section 4.3.2.5, padding can be represented using Σlp , where lp is the
length of padding. Padding can be seen as a special case of attack vector where FSA
for padding accepts all the strings of a given length. All the results regarding gener-
ating an attack vector can be applied to padding. A suitable padding for FSA IDS
can be generated in polynomial time using the algorithm presented in section 4.4.1.1.
NP-completeness proof, shown in section 4.4.1.2, can be used to prove that finding
an optimal padding which matches a given sFSA IDS is NP-complete. Furthermore,
the greedy algorithm and ILP reduction shown in section 4.4.1.3 can be used to find
a suitable padding.
4.4.4 Encrypted Attack Code and Key
In section 4.2, we used a simple byte substitution scheme for encryption. During
encryption, every attack character in the attack body is substituted by a normal
character. To store the reverse substitution (or decoding) table of the simple byte
substitution scheme, we use the same technique as before: the index of the decod-
ing table determines the attack character, and the entry at an index is the normal
character used to substitute the corresponding attack character.
The encryption techniques studied in this section include both XOR encryption
scheme and the byte substitution scheme. It is important to consider XOR because
there are several existing polymorphism tools that use XOR based encryption. These
tools may be extended to generate PBA. Unlike substitution, the decryption key for
XOR is the same as the encryption key, and can be stored in a straight forward
manner.
Both substitution and XOR are very simple schemes and are used in more complex
encryption schemes. By studying PBA with these simple schemes, we hope to develop
a understanding as well as solutions applicable to more complex schemes.
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We want to find an encryption key so that the attack packet sections of the
decryption key and the encrypted attack code, or Skey ac, can be accepted by the FSA
or the adjusted sFSA (for convenience, in this section we simply call the adjusted
sFSA a sFSA). We will show that this is a hard problem even when using very simple
encryption schemes, namely, substitution and XOR. As a corollary, the problem is
hard when using more complex encryption schemes. The most direct and important
corollary, however, is that the problem of generating a suitable encrypted attack code
is a hard problem.
A brute force approach to find the encryption key requires to generate every
possible key and check the distance (as defined by the IDS) of the Skey ac to the
(s)FSA. For a simple substitution-based (encryption) scheme, this will take at least
nPm(n−m)n−m iterations, where n is the number of unique normal characters and m
is the number of unique attack characters. For XOR encryption with key of length l,
finding an optimal polymorphic blending attack will take at least nl iterations. These
numbers can very large, and thus a brute force approach is often impractical.
In this section, we first analyze the hardness of finding an encryption key that
ensures Skey ac is a valid string accepted by the FSAids (without any transition prob-
abilities). We show that this problem is NP-complete. Thus, it may not be solvable
deterministically in polynomial time of the key length l or m. We show this result
for both byte substitution based encryption and XOR based encryption. This re-
sult can be extended to show that even if we allow solution to contain ε fraction of
invalid transitions, the problem is still NP-complete. We extend the above results
and argue that the problem of finding an encryption key that optimally matches the
Skey ac to sFSA or finding a solution within an ε range of the optimal solution is also
NP-complete.
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4.4.4.1 Substitution Based Encryption Scheme
We formally define the problem of finding a substitution key that ensures Skey ac is
accepted by the FSA of an IDS.
Definition 4.4.2 Given an attack code and the FSA of an IDS, the problem PBAFSAsub
is to find a one-to-one mapping from attack characters to normal characters so that
Skey ac is accepted by the given FSA.
Theorem 4.4.2 Problem PBAFSAsub is NP-complete.
Proof For a problem to be NP-complete, the problem should be in NP and should
be NP-hard.
A problem is in NP if a given solution can be verified for its correctness in polyno-
mial time. Given an one-to-one mapping, we can easily generate the decryption key
(a table) and the encrypted attack code. Since FSA is a decidable language, we can
verify in polynomial time whether or not Skey ac string will be accepted by the FSA.
Thus, we can efficiently verify if the one-to-one mapping is correct or not.
To prove that the problem is NP-hard, we reduce the well known 3-SAT problem
to PBAFSAsub . Consider a 3-SAT problem with q, q ≤ 128 variables and r clauses.
If q is smaller than 128, we add dummy unused variables to make total number of
variables 128. Suppose the 3-SAT problem is,
SAT = (x10 ∨ x11 ∨ x12) ∧ (x20 ∨ x21 ∨ x22) ∧ · · · ∧ (xr0 ∨ xr1 ∨ xr2),
where x10, x11, · · · , xr2 ∈ {x0, x0, x1, x1, · · ·x127, x127}.
Given the above 3-SAT, we design PBAFSAsub problem as follows. For every variable
xi in the 3-SAT, we have an attack character atti, two normal characters normi and
normi+128, and a corresponding entry eatti in the decryption table. eatti ,∀128 ≤ i ≤


























Figure 27: FSAα and attack substring for clause x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x8. For convenience, we
represent normi by just i.
as follows.
xi = 1, if and only if eatti = normi and eatti+128 = normi+128, (26)
= 0, if and only if eatti = normi+128 and eatti+128 = normi (27)
Table 8: Truth table and corresponding key table for clause x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x8
x1 x3 x8 eatt1 eatt3 eatt8
0 0 0 norm129 norm131 norm136
0 0 1 norm129 norm131 norm8
0 1 1 norm129 norm3 norm8
1 0 0 norm1 norm131 norm136
1 0 1 norm1 norm131 norm8
1 1 0 norm1 norm3 norm136
1 1 1 norm1 norm3 norm8
For every clause clauseα, 1 ≤ α ≤ r in the 3-SAT, we construct a section of FSA
(FSAα) as shown in Figure 27. First, we construct the truth table of the clause
(see Table 8). For each entry in the truth table, we have a path containing three
transitions where each transition corresponds to the value of a variable in the truth
table entry. In addition to FSAα, 1 ≤ α ≤ r, we have a section of FSA (FSAKT ) of
length 256 corresponding to the key.
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FSA FSA FSA FSA r1 2KT
(Enc. Key) (Attack Substring 1) (Attack Substring 2) (Attack Substring r)
KEY + ATTACK CODE
Figure 28: FSA and Skey ac corresponding to the SAT problem
Also, for every variable xi or xi in a clauseα, we have an attack character atti
in the attack code. Thus for every clause clauseα, we have a substring (strα) of
length 3 in the attack code. Figure 27 shows an example attack code substring for a
hypothetical clause. The encoded attack substring will be eatt1eatt3eatt8 .
In Figure 27, we can observe that the encrypted strα is accepted by the FSAα
if and only if the encoding of attack characters are chosen from one of the entries
in the given encoding table shown in Table 8. Since every entry in the encoding
table corresponds to an entry in the truth table of the clauseα, the encrypted strα is
accepted by the FSAα if and only if clauseα is true.
The final FSA, FSASAT , and the attack code corresponding to the 3-SAT problem
are shown in Figure 28. The construction of the above FSASAT takes polynomial
time. Please note that there exists a solution to the given PBAFSAsub problem if and
only if the encrypted strα is accepted by FSAα for all 1 ≤ α ≤ r.
If the above PBAFSAsub problem has a solution mapping eatti , 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, then
one can find assignments for variables xi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 127 using Equation 27. Since
Skey ac is accepted by FSASAT for mapping eatti , 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the encrypted strα
is accepted by FSAα for all 1 ≤ α ≤ r. However, the encrypted strα is accepted by
FSAα only if clauseα is true. Thus, all clauses of the 3-SAT problem is true and the
3-SAT is satisfied.
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Also, if there exists an assignment of variables xi such that the 3-SAT problem
is satisfied, then we can compute eatti using Equation 27. Since 3-SAT is satisfied,
all clauseα, 1 ≤ α ≤ r, are true. But clauseα is true only if the encrypted strα is
accepted by FSAα. Thus, all encrypted strα, 1 ≤ α ≤ r, are accepted by FSAα, and
Skey ac is accepted by FSASAT .
From above, we can conclude that PBAFSAsub is at least as hard as 3-SAT. Since
3-SAT is NP-hard, PBAFSAsub is also NP-hard. Since PBA
FSA
sub is also in NP, PBA
FSA
sub
is an NP-complete problem.
4.4.4.2 XOR Encryption Scheme
We formally define the problem statement of finding a XOR encryption key that
ensures Skey ac is accepted by the FSA of an IDS.
Definition 4.4.3 Given an attack code and the FSA of an IDS, the problem PBAFSAxor
is to find an encryption key, of length l, so that Skey ac is accepted by the given FSA.
Theorem 4.4.3 Problem PBAFSAxor is NP-complete.
Proof The proof of NP-completeness of PBAFSAxor is similar to the proof of PBA
FSA
sub .
First we show that PBAFSAxor is in NP. Given a solution encryption key (k0k2 · · · kl−1),
we can easily generate the encrypted attack code and hence the Skey ac. We can easily
verify in polynomial time if Skey ac is accepted by the FSA or not. Thus, the problem
is verifiable in polynomial time.
Now we show a reduction from 3-SAT to PBAFSAxor . Consider a 3-SAT problem
with q, q ≤ 128 variables and r clauses. If q is smaller than 128, we add dummy
unused variables to make total number of variables 128. Suppose the 3-SAT problem
is,
SAT = (x10 ∨ x11 ∨ x12) ∧ (x20 ∨ x21 ∨ x22) ∧ · · · ∧ (xr0 ∨ xr1 ∨ xr2),
























































Figure 29: FSAα for clause x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x8
Given above 3-SAT, we design PBAFSAxor problem as follows. For every variable
xi in 3-SAT, we have an attack character atti and two normal characters: normi and
normi+128. The value of the variable xi is related to XOR encryption key ki at ith
position is as follows.
xi = 1, if and only if ki = normi, (28)
= 0, if and only if ki = normi+128 (29)
Table 9: Truth table and corresponding key table for clause x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x8
x1 x3 x8 k1 k3 k8
0 0 0 norm129 norm131 norm136
0 0 1 norm129 norm131 norm8
0 1 1 norm129 norm3 norm8
1 0 0 norm1 norm131 norm136
1 0 1 norm1 norm131 norm8
1 1 0 norm1 norm3 norm136
1 1 1 norm1 norm3 norm8
For every clause clauseα in the 3-SAT, we have a FSA section, FSAα, which is
generated as follows (see Figure 29). First, we construct the truth table for clauseα
as shown in Table 9. For every entry in the truth table, we create a path of length 128










FSA FSA FSAKT 1 r
(00h            00h) (00h            00h)Key + Non−Encrypted Attack Code:
Key + Encrypted Attack Code:
0 1
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Figure 30: FSA and Skey ac corresponding to the SAT problem
FSAα has transition for normi. Otherwise, if variable xi is present in the clause, its
corresponding ith transition in FSAα has transition for normi+128. If neither xi nor
xi, is present in the clause, then the corresponding transition in FSAα has transitions
for both normi and normi+128. In addition to FSAα, 1 ≤ α ≤ r, we have a section
of FSA, FSADT , of length 128 corresponding to the decryption key.
Also, for every clause, we have a attack code substring of length 128 consisting
only of byte 00h (the NUL ASCII character). Thus, the encrypted attack code for this
given clause is 00 · · · 0 ⊕ k0 · · · k127 = k0 · · · k127.
The encrypted strα is accepted by the FSAα if and only if partial keys are chosen
from one of the entries in the given key table in Table 9. Since every entry in the
key table corresponds to an entry in the truth table of clauseα, the encrypted strα is
accepted by the FSAα if and only if clauseα is true.
The final FSA, FSASAT , and attack code corresponding to the 3-SAT problem
are shown in Figure 30. It takes polynomial time to construct FSASAT . Please note
that there exists a solution to the given PBAFSAxor problem if and only if the encrypted
strα is accepted by FSAα for all 1 ≤ α ≤ r.
If the above PBAFSAxor problem has a solution encryption key key, then we can find
assignments for variables xi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 127 using Equation 29. Since Skey ac is accepted
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by FSASAT for key key, the encrypted strα is accepted by FSAα for all 1 ≤ α ≤ r.
The encrypted strα is accepted by FSAα only if clauseα is true. Thus, all clauses are
true and we have a solution for the 3-SAT problem.
Also, if there exists a 3-SAT solution assignment of variables xi, then using Equa-
tion 27 we can compute the encryption key. All clauseα, 1 ≤ α ≤ r, of the 3-SAT
is true for the given variable assignment. Since clauseα is true only if the encrypted
strα is accepted by FSAα, all encrypted strα, 1 ≤ α ≤ r, are accepted by FSAα.
Thus, Skey ac is accepted by FSASAT .
Thus, PBAFSAxor is as hard as 3-SAT. Since PBA
FSA





We have now proved that finding an encryption key that ensures Skey ac is accepted by
the FSA of an IDS is NP-complete. Suppose we allow the solution to have ε‖Skey ac‖
number of invalid transitions, the problem still remains NP-hard because of the fact
that (1− ε)-SAT (or ε-UNSAT, ε < 1) is an NP-hard problem.
Now consider the problem of finding an encryption key that optimally matches
the Skey ac to sFSA. This problem is considered harder than PBA
FSA
sub/xor because in
addition to the requirement of using only valid transitions of the sFSA, we need
to match the probability of each transition in the sFSA. Thus, finding the suitable
encryption key for sFSA should be NP-hard. Following similar logic above, we can
also conclude that finding an encryption key which matches the Skey ac to sFSA within
ε bound of the optimal solution is also NP-hard.
Substitution and XOR are among the simplest encryption schemes. In fact, the
more complex encryption schemes such AES and DES [25] use substitution and XOR
as basic operations. Since we have shown that the problem is hard when the simpler
schemes are in use, we can conclude that the problem is still hard when using the
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other more complex encryption schemes.
To conclude, we have shown that finding an encryption key that ensures Skey ac is
accepted by the (s)FSA of an IDS is a hard problem (NP-complete).
4.4.4.4 Approximate Solutions
The most direct and important corollary is that the problem of generating a polymor-
phic blending attack by encrypting attack code is hard. In Section 4.4.4.1 and 4.4.4.2,
we showed that the problem of finding an appropriate encryption key for a polymor-
phic blending attack is very hard. That is, it may take time exponential to the key
length or character size. Although an attacker may not have any time restrictions, a
polynomial time solution is clearly more desirable. There are good heuristic solvers
available for the SAT problems or Integer Linear Programming (ILP) problems. These
solvers provide approximate solutions in very reasonable amount of time. If we have
a non-stochastic, or FSA based, IDS, we can reduce the polymorphic blending attack
problem to a SAT problem. For a sFSA based IDS, we can map the problem to ILP.
Before we show the SAT or ILP reduction, we would reduce the problem of finding
an appropriate encryption key to the problem of finding a path from the start state
to accept states in a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). An edge in the DAG may have
constraints of the form ki = j, j ∈ U , where U is the set of all characters. The
chosen path should contain minimal number of conflicting constraints. In addition,
we may have some restrictions on the frequency of occurrences of edges corresponding
to the frequency matching requirement for sFSA. In the following sections, we use
the example shown in Figures 23 and 24 to illustrate the concept.
4.4.4.4.1 Construction of DAG Given a (s)FSA, a key length (lk), and an
attack code ac of length lac, we construct a DAG of depth lk + lac as follows. Suppose
s0 is the end state of the path in (s)FSA as traced by the attack vector and the
decryptor. v0 is the root vertex of the DAG corresponding to state s0. At every
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depth d of the DAG, we have a set of vertices Vd = {vdi} such that the state vi is
reachable from state s0 in exactly d transitions in (s)FSA. The accept vertices of
the DAG are the leaf vertices at depth lk + lac, which correspond to accept states in
the (s)FSA. There exists an edge edij from vdi to v(d+1)j if and only if there exists a
transition tij from state vi to state vj in (s)FSA. The weight of the edge is proportional
to the probability of transition tij. The constraint constrdij associated with an edge
edij at depth d is shown below.
constrdij = (kd == charij), if d < lk,
= (kac[d−lk] == charij), if d ≥ lk and substitution,
= (k(d mod lk) ⊕ ac[d− lk] == charij), if d ≥ lk and XOR
where charij is the normal character corresponding to transition tij and ac[i] is the
attack character at the i position of attack code. An example construction of DAG is
shown in Figure 31. The DAG corresponds to the example FSA and example attack





































Figure 31: DAG corresponding to example FSA
x0a
0x b
1 x  a
1bx
1bx 0x b 0x b
x0a x0a
0x b 0x b
1 x  a




1 x  a
Figure 32: SAT representation of example DAG
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The problem of finding an appropriate encryption key for a given attack code and
FSA is equivalent to finding a path from the root vertex to an accept vertex in the
DAG. Given a path Pdag in DAG consisting of edges with no (or minimal) conflicting
constraints, we can find the encryption key by setting the constraints of the edges on
the path to true. The path Pfsa followed by Skey ac in the (s)FSA is similar to the
path Pdag. If edij is an edge at depth d in Pdag then transition tij is in Pfsa at depth
d.
4.4.4.4.2 Translation to SAT If the given IDS is an FSA with no probabilities
on transitions, the problem of finding a appropriate path in DAG can be translated
to SAT. First, we translate the DAG problem to CIRCUIT-SAT [12]. Then we can
efficiently translate CIRCUIT-SAT to SAT. For each constraint of the form ki = j in
the DAG, we have a variable xij that is true if and only if the constraint is satisfied,
and false otherwise. Now we can directly translate the DAG to CIRCUIT-SAT. A
vertex v with input degree degin in DAG has a corresponding OR gate (ORv) in
CIRCUIT-SAT with degin inputs. For every outgoing edge (with some constraint
ki = j) of a vertex v, we have a AND gate whose input is xij and ORv. The final
output is OR of all the accept states. Figure 32 shows the conversion of our example
DAG to CIRCUIT-SAT. We can then efficiently translate the CIRCUIT-SAT into a
SAT problem. In the given SAT problem, we need to add additional requirement
that a given key ki is assigned to only one normal character. This means if xij is
true then xij′ is false for all j
′ 6= j. Also, for substitution based encryption scheme,
we need to add additional clauses in the SAT to ensure that a normal character is
assigned to a single attack character. These cardinality constraints can be efficiently
represented in SAT [53]. Furthermore, for a substitution scheme, there exists empty
entries in the decryption key table corresponding to the characters not present in the
attack code. These characters can be mapped to any unassigned normal character.
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i∈M xij) ∨ (
∨
i∈M xij)), where M
and N are the set of attack and normal characters, respectively. We can solve the
final SAT problem using one of the several available SAT solvers, which are capable
of solving huge SAT (or ε-UNSAT) problems in reasonable time.
4.4.4.4.3 Translation to ILP For a sFSA IDS, we propose to translate the
problem of finding a good path in a DAG into a Integer Linear Programming problem.
ILP is known to be NP-hard but there exist multiple good heuristics to solve big ILP
problems. An ILP tries to find the minimum of a linear function over a set of variables
defined by a finite number of linear constraints. All the variables in the solution should
be integer. An ILP is called 0-1 ILP if all the variables are required to be either 0
or 1. Now we will show the reduction of finding the optimal path in a DAG to ILP
problem.
For every edge edij at level d in the DAG, we have a variable hedij .
hedij = 1 if edge edij is in the solution path of DAG, (30)
= 0 otherwise (31)
For every constraint xi = j in the DAG, we have a variable constrij.
constrij = 1 if constraint xi = j is true in the solution of DAG, (32)
= 0 otherwise (33)
There is a valid path from start vertex to an accept vertex if and only if the number
of selected outgoing edges at start state is one, the number of selected incoming edges
is equal to the number of selected outgoing edges for all the intermediate vertices, and
the number of selected incoming edges is equal to one for one of the end vertices. An
edge is selected if it is in the solution path. These three conditions can be represent




he + errv0 = 1 (34)∑
e∈IN(Vaccept)
he + erraccept = 1 (35)∑
e∈IN(vdi)
he + errdi =
∑
e∈OUT (vdi)
he,∀ vdi at depth d,∀1 ≤ d ≤ lk + lac − 1 (36)
where IN(v) and OUT (v) is the set of in and out edges of vertex v, respectively. vdi is
the ith vertex at depth d. The err terms account for invalid paths in the solution and
are 0 if the path conditions are satisfied. In case, the condition is not satisfied, errdi
can be either 1 or -1 depending on the difference of the number of selected incoming
and outgoing edges at given node.
At any depth d, 0 ≤ d ≤ lk + lac − 1, the number of edges from vertices at depth
d to vertices at depth d + 1 should be one. That is,
∑
e∈OUT (Vd)
he + errVd = 1,∀0 ≤ d ≤ lk + lac − 1 (37)
where Vd is the set of vertices at depth d. Again, the errVd term account for the
errors. errVd can take values 0 or 1 depending on the number of outgoing edges at a
given depth.
If an edge in the DAG is chosen in the path, the corresponding constraint should be
satisfied. Suppose constre represents the constraint associated with edge e. Then the
requirement can be satisfied using following equation: constre ≥ he,∀ edge e ∈ DAG.
Further, we can ensure that a given key is assigned to only one character by using
following equation: ∑
j∈U
constrij = 1,∀0 ≤ i ≤ lk (38)
where U is the set of all possible characters and lk is the key length.
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For one-to-one byte substitution scheme, a normal character should not be as-
signed to multiple attack characters. That is,
∑
i∈M
constrij ≤ 1,∀j ∈ N (39)
where M and N are the set of attack and normal characters, respectively. The fol-
lowing set of equations ensure that the characters not present in the attack character
set are mapped only to normal characters not assigned to attack characters.
NACj × ‖M‖ ≥
∑
i∈M




xij ≤ 1,∀j ∈ N (41)
The first equation makes sure that NACj is 1 if any non-attack character is mapped
to a normal character j. The second equation ensures that if NACj is 1, then normal
character j is not assigned to any attack character, and, vice-versa.
The above set of equations guarantee that there exists a path from the start vertex
and the end vertex with some errors. Now we present the minimization criteria to









where κt is some constant associated with transition t, pt is the probability of the
transition to be taken in sFSA, and numt is the number of times the transition t is
taken by the Skey ac.
The minimization criteria for the ILP problem can be then written as:
∑
transition t ∈sFSA











where Vdag is the set of vertices in the DAG and σ is the weight of the errors caused
by taking a invalid transition in the sFSA. Note that the |α−β| term in minimization
can be rewritten as absdiff where, α− β ≥ −absdiff and α− β ≤ absdiff .
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Solving the above ILP for the given minimization criteria will provide the en-
cryption key. Using this we can generate the encrypted attack code and prepare the
polymorphic blending attack packet by concatenating attack vector, decryptor, de-
cryption key, and the encrypted attack code. We can then perform padding to match
the final attack packet even closer to the normal.
4.4.4.4.4 Heuristic Solutions Rather than finding the optimal solution, an at-
tacker may simply apply some heuristics that produce an approximate (or good
enough) solution using much less resources (time and memory). Here we present
a simple heuristic that finds a good approximate solution very efficiently.
The heuristic is based on the hill climbing search algorithm, which is used widely
in artificial intelligence and constraint solving. Hill climbing starts with an initial
solution and iteratively improves it. At each step, the algorithm looks at neighbor-
ing solutions and choose one that is better than current solution. The definition of
neighbors depends on the problem domain.
We now present our heuristic. Given an IDS and an attack instance, we choose a
random encryption key and calculate the distance between Skey ac and (s)FSA. Now,
we randomly choose a ki to modify in the key. For all the possible character (c) values,
we first temporarily assign ki = c. For a substitution scheme, if c is already assigned
to some attack character kj, we temporarily swap the normal characters assigned to
ki and kj. We then find the new distance to (s)FSA using the temporary key. We
choose the character that reduces the distance by the maximum value and assign it
to ki. At this point, a new key position (kj) is chosen to modify and the process is
repeated. This above process is iterated for the desired number of iterations or till a
satisfactory solution is produced.
It is possible in the above approach to reach a local maximum that is not very close
to the optimal solution. We reach a local maximum if modifying any key increases the
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distance to (s)FSA. To overcome this problem, whenever we reach local maximum, we
choose a small set of key positions and set them to some random values, and restart
the above iterative process of finding solution. The idea is by randomly picking
another starting point in the solution space, the new solution point may belong to a
locale that has better local maximum.
The above heuristic can give us very good solution depending on the number of
iterations. The pseudo-code for the heuristic is shown in Appendix B.4
4.5 Experiments and Results
The motivation of our research was to address the open problem: given an anomaly
detection system and an attack, can one automatically generate the PBA instances?
Thus, in our experiments, we wanted to directly compare our formal framework with
the more ad-hoc approaches developed before. The key elements of our experiment
set-up were the same as in Section 4.2. We used the same anomaly detection sys-
tems, namely, PAYL 1-gram and 2-gram, as well as the same attack and same traffic
datasets, as in Section 4.2.6.1. The results showed that, although our framework
is based on an abstract model of IDS and uses general algorithms, it automatically
generated PBA instances that were more evasive (i.e. better matched the IDS normal
profiles) than or at least as good as the PBA instances from the more PAYL specific
algorithms in Section 4.2.
Briefly, the experimental dataset contains 7 days of Web traffic with 4.7 million
packets. 4.3 million packets were used for training the IDS profile. A part of the
remaining traffic was used to generate/train an artificial profile used by the attacker.
We generated PAYL 1-gram and 2-gram models (using the 14 days of traffic) for
three different packet lengths, namely, 418, 730, and 1460. The attack vector is based
on the implementation of firew0rker [18]. More information of the dataset can be
found in Section 4.2.6.
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For all the experiments, we divided the attack flow into multiple packets. The
attack vector was placed at the start of the first packet. The decryptor was divided
into several sections and allotted to different attack packets. The attack body was
also divided into multiple chunks. The sFSA corresponding to the artificial profile was
adjusted for attack vector and polymorphic decryptor. A separate encryption key for
each attack body fragment was generated using our framework to match the adjusted
artificial profile. Each attack body fraction was encrypted using the corresponding
key and appended to the corresponding attack packet. Then each attack packet was
padded to the desired packet length. The final attack packets were then used together
to launch an attack.
4.5.1 PAYL 1-gram Evasion
We applied our framework to generate polymorphic blending attacks to evade 1-gram
PAYL, using substitution-based encryption and XOR encryption, respectively. For
the XOR scheme, we used a 64 byte key. For each encryption scheme, we translated
the problem of finding the optimal encryption key for 1-gram evasion to an ILP
problem. We used ILOG CPLEX to solve the ILP problems. CPLEX is a commercial
optimization tool for solving Mixed Integer Programs (MIP). We obtained a near-
optimal solution (i.e., encryption key) for the ILP problems. The attack code was
then encrypted using this key, and padding was performed. For comparison, we also
generated polymorphic blending attacks using the greedy one-to-one local substitution
scheme presented in Section 4.2.3.2.1.
It took 6.5 seconds on average to solve an ILP problem on a Pentium-M 2GHz
machine. The solution provided was within 0.2% of the optimal solution. Figure 33
shows the distance of the attack flow from the artificial profile and the IDS profile.
The results for both substitution and XOR encryption schemes, as well as the greedy
scheme from Section 4.2.3.2.1, are shown in the figure. The x-axis shows the number
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of packets attack flow was divided into and the y-axis shows distance of the attack
flow from the artificial profile and IDS normal profile. This distance is the maximum
of the distances of individual attack packets in a flow. A horizontal line corresponding

















































































Figure 33: Anomaly score or error distance of 1-gram blending attack. The plots
with prefix att and ids corresponds to distance from the artificial profile and the IDS
profile, respectively. xor and sub corresponds to the PBA generated for XOR and
substitution based schemes using our framework. prev denotes the algorithm from
previous paper.
The error distance of attack generated for substitution based encryption using
ILP is almost identical to the greedy approach. Thus, the greedy 1-gram blending
approach also provides a near optimal substitution table.
The error distance for attacks generated using the XOR encryption scheme is
much higher. This is expected. For substitution, by replacing attack characters
with normal characters, we can ensure that only normal characters are present in
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the mutated attack packet. For XOR, it is harder to find an appropriate key such
that it contains only normal characters and XORing it with attack characters also
results in only normal characters. For packet length 418 and 730, the error distance
of PBA generated using XOR based scheme is twice or more than the substitution-
based scheme. For packet length 1460, the error distance for XOR based scheme is
comparatively smaller. Also, the difference decreases as the number of attack packets
in the attack flow increases. The large amount of padding space available masks the
error produced by the attack code in XOR based scheme.
In the graphs, all the attack points below the horizontal error threshold line will
not be detected by the IDS with a 1% false positive rate. If the false positive rate is
decreased, typically the anomaly error threshold is increased. That is, the horizontal
line is moved up, and more attack points will be missed by the IDS.
For packet length 730 and 1460, we need only two packets to evade PAYL 1-gram
when using substitution. The IDS can be evaded using attack flow of size as low as
1460. For packet length 418, we need 8 packets to evade the IDS. The XOR based
scheme can also evade the IDS for packet lengths 730 and 1460, although with bigger
attack size. For packet length 418, XOR needs to divide attack packets into many
more number of packets in order to evade the IDS.
4.5.2 PAYL 2-gram Evasion
We also generated polymorphic blending attacks to evade PAYL 2-gram. We used
the heuristic presented in Section 4.4.4.4.4 to generate such attacks. We started
with a random solution and iterated the hill climbing steps 25000 times. The best
encryption key seen during the process was recorded. The attack code was then
encrypted using this key and the attack packet was padded to the desired length. The
distance of the attack flow from the normal profiles was recorded. For comparison, we
also generated the polymorphic blending attacks using the greedy 2-gram blending
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algorithm presented in Section 4.2.4.2.
For substitution based encryption, it took 10min on average to perform 25000
iterations on a given problem. For XOR encryption, performing 25000 iterations took
little more than an hour on average. The time of each iteration is dependent on the
range of keys and the number of terms in the distance calculation. For substitution,
the range of keys is all the normal characters; whereas in XOR, the range of keys can
be set of all the possible characters. Also, since XOR is not able to match the normal
profiles closely, there several new 2-grams in the attack packet and thus the number
of terms in the distance calculation may become big. These two reasons attribute to
long running time for XOR.
The distances of the attack packets from the normal profiles are shown in Fig-
ure 34. The results for substitution-based encryption and XOR encryption, as well
as the greedy scheme are shown, along with a horizontal line corresponding to error
threshold of the 1% IDS false positive rate.
Using substitution, our heuristic-based approach is able to better match the nor-
mal profile than the previous greedy approach for most attack instances. For packet
length 418, when the number of attack packets is 8 or 9, the previous approach
matches the normal profile better than the heuristic from our framework. Checking
the distance of individual attack packets, we observed that for some packets, the
heuristic got stuck in a bad local maximum for considerable number of iterations.
Thus, the heuristic was not able to find a good solution in the given number of iter-
ations. In such cases, one can restart the heuristic using another random solution or
run the heuristic for more number of iterations.
Compared with PAYL 1-gram, we needed more number of attack packets to evade
PAYL 2-gram. The minimum attack size required to evade the PAYL 2-gram is 2190,






















































































Figure 34: Anomaly scores of 2-gram blending attacks.
4.6 Countermeasures
The experimental results reported above show that the statistical models used by
current network anomaly detection systems are not sufficiently accurate in detecting
deliberate evasion attempts. By following the ideas presented in this thesis, it may
be fairly easy to devise different blending algorithms in order to evade other network
anomaly IDSs that rely solely on packet statistics.
Given an IDS that is vulnerable to a polymorphic blending attack, we want to
identify the shortcomings of the IDS and improve the IDS so that these evasive attacks
are harder to generate. It is desirable to modify the IDS so that the IDS is resistant
to blending attacks generated using any attack vector, attack code, or decryptor. In
the following section, we present the drawbacks of current anomaly IDSs and steps
that can be taken to improve the robustness of an IDS.
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4.6.1 Drawbacks of Current Anomaly IDSs
As discussed earlier, current anomaly IDSs can be modeled as an (s)FSA. An IDS also
uses a classifier to discriminate attacks from normal data. The input features used
by the classifier are the transition frequencies of each transition in the (s)FSA. The
existence of evasive attacks can be attributed to shortcomings in the FSA model or
features. These attacks may also be possible due to unsuitable classifiers or distance-
metrics used by the IDS. Some of the drawbacks of anomaly IDSs are:
• Imprecise (s)FSA model
• Non-discriminating and noisy features
• Distance-based classifier
• Deterministic algorithm
• Single feature set
4.6.1.1 Imprecise (s)FSA model
Anomaly detection systems presented in Section 4.3.1 use simple statistics or packet
structure to represent the normal traffic. Since any service provided over a network
follows certain application level protocols, a normal request to the service should fol-
low the given protocol syntax and semantics. These application syntax and semantics
related information cannot be modeled accurately using simple statistics of network
packets. Therefore, the simple statistics, and hence the (s)FSA, used by a payload
network anomaly IDS is an imprecise representation of normal traffic. It may be
possible to match the statistics using a polymorphic blending attack instance. Fig-
ure 35 shows a hypothetical scenario where the (s)FSA model is not precise enough to
detect polymorphic blending attacks. Attacks match the normal profile very closely
and overlap with normal data in the feature space. In the given scenario, the (s)FSA
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(b) Feature space view
Figure 35: Example of an imprecise sFSA model. The circles represent normal
data points and the crosses represent attack data points. The rectangular box is the
complete feature space. The ellipse represents the normal boundary.
Instead of using simple statistics, an IDS should use normal protocol semantics.
By using more protocol semantics and syntactic information, the IDS can represent
the structure of normal traffic more precisely. It should be harder for an adversary to
compromise a system while following the normal protocol semantics. Some protocol-
based, or equivalently specification-based anomaly detection systems proposed in the
IDS research community are [65, 52]. Protocol-based anomaly detection systems
ensure that the monitored traffic follows certain protocol semantics. They also check
if some statistical patterns of these semantic information match the normal statistics.
The protocol-based anomaly detection systems are effective in detection of attacks
which misuse protocols.
However, modeling protocol syntax and semantic is computationally more expen-
sive than measuring simple traffic statistics. A typical protocol-based IDS requires
parsing the traffic, checking the syntax of the packets, maintaining a state to follow
the status of the flow, and matching the semantics. This process requires a lot of
memory and processing time. In addition, a protocol-based anomaly IDS needs to
know all the applications running in the network along with their detailed protocol
110
specification. This may be infeasible if the system provides multiple services, or if the
protocol semantics are frequently modified. Furthermore, the protocol semantic pat-
terns learnt from a given normal dataset do not generalize well for previously unseen
normal access to the service. Thus, such an IDS may produce a lot of false positives.
Therefore, the trade-off between detection accuracy, hardness of evasion, operational
speed, and the IDS management has to be considered.
4.6.1.2 Non-discriminating and noisy features
Not all the features in a given feature set are useful for detection purposes. A feature
may be non-discriminating; that is, the value of the feature is the same for both
the normal data and attack data. It may also be noisy with very high standard
deviation. These features can actually reduce the IDS accuracy. For example, in
case of n-gram PAYL, there can be some n-grams whose frequencies are inconsistent
throughout different normal packets and may force the IDS to have a higher error
threshold. Thus, a PBA that was above the error threshold and detectable by the
IDS otherwise, may not be detectable if we use these noisy n-grams. An IDS should
perform feature extraction and select a set of features that are useful in differentiating
attacks from the normal.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is commonly used for feature extraction.
PCA is useful only if data from both classes are present. Initially, the features are
de-correlated using Karhunen-Loeve Transform (KLT). PCA assumes that the dif-
ference between classes are contained in the high variance features. To improve the
performance of the classifier, only the features with high variance are chosen and low
variance features are removed.
The anomaly IDS is a one-class classifier and data from only normal class is
assumed to be available. Unlike a multi-class classifier, the feature extraction principle
used for PCA does not hold true and high variance features may not necessarily be
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good in finding outliers. Tax and Muller [60] showed that for one-class classification,
features with low variance features are informative and are better for finding outliers.
To improve the IDS, we should choose low variance features. The less noisy features
set should be better in detecting polymorphic blending attacks.
4.6.1.3 Distance-based classifier
Once an IDS has determined the value of features (or state transition frequencies),
it uses a classifier to calculate its distance from the original set of normal features.
Most of the current proposed IDSs use a very simple distance-based classifier similar
to the Minkowski distance metric. These classifiers use a weighted sum of deviation
of features from the mean normal value of the feature. They also assume that the
features are independent. This assumption significantly reduces the complexity and
the overhead of the distance calculation. But due to their simple design and flawed
assumptions, these classifiers may not be well suited for anomaly detection.
Furthermore, the classifier performance depends on the characteristics of the data.
The distance-based classifiers used by anomaly IDSs work well if the normal data
follows Gaussian distribution and the attack data is linearly separable from the normal
data. It is possible for the normal data to follow different distributions which may
not be suitable for such distance-based classifiers. Thus, these classifiers may not
differentiate between the normal data and attacks satisfactorily.
Therefore, instead of using a simple distance-based classifier, an anomaly IDS
needs to use more powerful classifiers. Some of the powerful and complex classifiers
are decision trees, neural networks, bayesian networks, hidden markov models and
support vector machines. There is no single classifier that works best for all given
problems [49]. Thus, an IDS designer needs to determine the data characteristics
and use empirical tests to find the best classifier. Some of these classifiers are high
resource consuming and may not be suitable for real-time detection purposes. Again
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we need to find a middle-ground between run time resource overheads and detection
accuracy.
4.6.1.4 Deterministic algorithm
Most of the current proposed anomaly IDSs use a deterministic algorithm or classifier
to detect attacks. We assume that the adversary knows the complete detection mech-
anism, including the learning algorithm, and the detection algorithm. In polymorphic
blending attacks, the adversary uses these information along with the blending algo-
rithms presented here to generate attacks that are able to evade the IDS.
A possible countermeasure is to introduce randomness in the IDS model. Consider
an IDS that uses multiple profiles, say X number of profiles, to represent the normal
traffic. These normal profiles are generated using different classifiers and different
sets of features, that are at least partially independent. Suppose the IDS also uses
an input parameter that is generated randomly. Based on the value of this random
parameter, the IDS may use different feature sets and classifiers to detect intrusions.
Since the adversary does not know the value of these parameters, the adversary has
two options while generating a polymorphic blending attack.
1. First, the adversary may try to guess which profile is being used currently by
the IDS for detection and may try to generate a polymorphic blending attack to
evade that particular normal profile. If the adversary guesses correctly, he/she
has a high chance of evading the IDS. But if the adversary guesses wrong,
then given that the features used in different normal profiles are different and
partially independent, there is a small chance that the attack might match the
normal profile currently used by the IDS. Thus, with high probability, the attack
will be detected by the IDS. Since the probability of the adversary guessing
correctly is small (around 1
X
), the overall chances of the adversary succeeding
in evading the IDS is small.
113
2. The adversary may try to match all the normal profiles in order to ensure that
the attack is not detected, no matter which normal profile is being used by the
IDS. But matching all the profiles may be significantly harder than matching a
single profile.
Thus, in both cases using randomization makes it harder for the adversary to
evade the IDS. Unlike other countermeasures, using randomization does not have
any evident performance dis-advantages. But determining sets of features that are
partially independent and are also sufficient in detecting attacks may not be easy. One
needs to take care in ensuring that each randomized model is adequate in detection
of traditional attacks.
4.6.1.5 Single feature set
Anomaly IDSs discussed in Section 4.3.1 use a single feature set to represent a given
packet or a section of a packet. For example, PAYL uses n-gram distribution of
the whole payload to represent normal payloads. [31] uses a statistical feature or
structure to represent a given section of normal traffic. Therefore, for each section,
the adversary is required to match a single statistical model to evade the IDS.
A better defense approach is to use multiple IDS models that use independent
features to record normal profiles. A monitored packet is normal if and only if the
packet matches all or a majority of the models. Therefore, in order to evade detection,
a polymorphic blending attack created by the adversary will need to match all (or
the majority) of the models. This can be significantly harder than matching a single
model if features used for different models are independent. Independent features
ensure that matching one model does not automatically imply matching other models.
An IDS using multiple models [43] is shown to be effective in detection of polymorphic
blending attacks.
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Using multiple models for detection requires significantly more computing re-
sources, including cpu and memory, as compared to a single model. Also, multiple
models may be restrictive and a new unseen normal pattern may not be accepted
by all or a majority of the models. Thus, we expect the IDS to have a higher false
positive rate.
4.6.2 Improving the Robustness of an (s)FSA IDS
To improve the robustness of an (s)FSA IDS, we need to identify the shortcomings
of the IDS and improve on it using the principles presented in Section 4.6.1.
4.6.2.1 Improving (s)FSA
Figure 35 shows an example vulnerable sFSA IDS and a blending attack for the IDS.
Since the PBA matches very closely to the sFSA, irrespective of the classifier used,
the IDS will not be able to detect the attack. Therefore, the sFSA used by the IDS
is not sufficient to detect the attacks. The IDS needs to improve the sFSA to detect
the attacks.
A possible approach to improve an (s)FSA model is to modify the current (s)FSA
by deleting transitions from the (s)FSA. First, we collect many attack instances for
different known attacks on the system. For each of these instances, we generate several
polymorphic blending attacks using techniques described in previous sections. We find
transitions in the sFSA that are traversed frequently by many polymorphic blending
attacks. Finally, we delete these transitions from the (s)FSA. The new modified
(s)FSA should be able to detect the PBAs that were generated earlier. However,
there may be lot of normal packets taking these removed transitions. Therefore,
the modified (s)FSA IDS may have high false positive rate. Furthermore, once the
adversary knows which transitions have been removed from the (s)FSA, she may
generate PBAs that do not traverse the deleted transitions and thus the modified
(s)FSA may not detect new PBAs. Therefore, modifying an (s)FSA is not a judicious
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choice to improve the robustness of the IDS. An IDS developer needs to completely
redesign the IDS by choosing better protocol semantic features.
4.6.2.2 Feature Extraction
Once we decide to use a given (s)FSA model to detect attacks, we can improve the
features used by the IDS classifier. We can remove the features that are noisy or not
useful in discriminating attacks from the normal.
If we do not have attack data available, we can perform feature extraction by
performing Karhunen-Loeve transform on the normal training data and selecting low
variance features. Given the initial set of features, we calculate the correlation matrix.
Eigenvectors and corresponding eigenvalues are calculated for the given correlation
matrix. The low variance features are the eigenvectors with smaller eigenvalues.
Therefore, we choose the eigenvectors with small eigenvalues. We can use this ap-
proach to improve the IDS shown in figure 36. Instead of using two features f1 and
f2, we can perform Karhunen-Loeve transform for the normal dataset, and get two
new uncorrelated features, fnew1 and f
new
2 . Since f
new
1 is the low variance feature, we
use it for detection. For the same false positive rate, the new IDS using single feature
























































Figure 36: Example of feature extraction. Unlike the original normal boundary
(ellipse), the normal boundary for the new IDS (shaded area) does not contain any
attacks.
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In case the attack data set is available, it is possible to use PCA and select discrim-
inating features. First, we collect many attack instances for different known attacks
on the system. For each of these attack instances, we generate several polymor-
phic blending attacks, using techniques described in section 4.4. We use these PBAs
along with the normal training data and find new set of features using Karhunen-
Loeve transform. Then, we choose features that have high variance. Selected features
should be effective in detecting PBAs generated using the attack vector and the at-
tack code used during PCA. However, this approach may not be helpful in detecting
PBAs generated using other attack vectors and attack codes. In fact, choosing high
variance features may actually reduce the detection capability of the IDS.
4.6.2.3 Improved classifier
Suppose features used by an IDS are not noisy and are good for discriminating attacks
from the normal. But due to the classifier’s limitation, the IDS may not be able to
discriminate attack from the normal. An example of such a classifier problem is shown
in figure 37(a). The data points and the PBAs are mapped to mutually separate
spaces. However, they are not separable by an IDS which uses a simple distance-
based classifier. In this scenario, to improve the robustness of the IDS, we need to
use a powerful classifier. Since it is not possible to use a classifier that works best for
all types of features and datasets, we need to experiment with several classifiers and
choose the one that works best for the given training dataset and training features.
The robustness of the IDS shown in figure 37(a) can be improved by using a better
classifier that uses a different decision surface as shown in figure 37(b).
4.6.2.4 Randomization
There are several ways to include randomization in the IDS to make it harder for an










































































Figure 37: Example of classifier improvement.
• Feature Selection: From a given feature set, we can randomly choose a subset
of features to be used by the classifier for detection. These subset of features
should be adequate to discern attacks from the normal. Features can be chosen
from the original feature set or from the transformed (for example Karhunen-
Loeve transform) feature set.
• Merge features: We can randomly merge features from the original feature set
to obtain a new feature set. The new features can be calculated as linear
combination of chosen features. Using a pseudo-random number generator, we
can choose a certain number of features from the original feature set and merge
them. We can also use a hash function to hash original features and merge
features which have the same hash-value.
A preferred method to merge a set of features is to use Karhunen-Loeve trans-
form on the original subset of features and choose the transformed feature with
minimum variance.
• Distance calculation: We can use different randomization techniques for distance
calculation. An IDS can randomly choose a classifier from a set or pre-chosen
classifiers that are known to work well. Also, the IDS can use randomization
by tuning the parameters used by the classifier. In these cases, randomization
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is used to exploit the different generalization capabilities of different classifiers.
This approach may not be effective as different models still use the same set of
features.
• Data Sampling: Another dimension of randomization is to monitor different
parts of the data. Unlike traditional IDSs which monitor the complete data
payload, we can create multiple models, each representing the normal pattern
of a particular portion of the payload [70]. During monitoring, we can use a
subset of these models for detection. Since the adversary does not know which
portion of the payload is monitored by the IDS, the adversary needs to ensure
that each portion of the attack packet matches the normal profile.
4.6.2.5 Multiple feature sets
To improve a given (s)FSA IDS, we generate a multiple subset of features that are
independent. We cannot obtain completely new sets of features that are indepen-
dent of current feature set because that will require further knowledge of the normal
traffic. Instead, we can divide the initial feature set into multiple subsets of features
that are uncorrelated and possibly independent. First, we take the initial features
and de-correlate them using Karhunen-Loeve transform [14]. We can also use Inde-
pendent Component Analysis to get a new feature set that is independent. Then, we
divide the transformed features into multiple independent or uncorrelated subsets.
This approach is useful if each individual transformed feature subset is sufficient for
detecting intrusions.
In figure 38, the IDS using both the features cannot detect PBAs for a given false
positive rate. However, suppose the IDS creates two models using feature f1
new and
f2
new, respectively. Also, suppose a packet is considered normal if and only if the
output of at least one of these two models is normal. Thus, using multiple models
with different feature sets, the IDS will be able to detect the attacks while maintaining
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same false positive rate. This improvement approach is useful in the cases where the





















































































Figure 38: Example of IDS improvement using multi classifier. To remove the false
positive, IDS considers area under ellipse as normal. However, using two model with
features using f1
new and f2
new, respectively, IDS can ensure that only shaded area is
normal and PBAs lie outside the normal.
Please note that, depending on the characteristics of polymorphic blending attacks
and quality of the feature set (or the (s)FSA model), it may or may not be possible
to improve the robustness of the IDS using the techniques discussed above.
4.6.3 Experiments
We performed experiments to determine the effectiveness of different improvement
techniques presented in Section 4.6.2. We used PAYL 1-gram and 2-gram anomaly
detection systems for our experiments. We compared the robustness of improved
PAYL IDS with the original PAYL IDS. We also measured the monitoring time of
improved PAYL and compared it with the original PAYL to demonstrate the perfor-
mance trade-off of different improvement techniques.
4.6.3.1 Experiment Setup
4.6.3.1.1 Dataset We used the same training dataset as in Section 4.6.2. The
dataset contained 7 days of traffic coming to the CoC web server. Normal data packets
from five hosts/LANs were chosen to train the artificial profile used by the adversary.
Out of the rest of the data, 1 day of traffic was used to train the IDS normal profile
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and the remaining 6 days of traffic were used to test the IDS. We used 7-fold cross-
validation to verify the results of our experiments.
4.6.3.1.2 Blending Attack Three different attacks were used for the experi-
ment. We used the windows media services attack (MS03-022) and same attack body
as discussed in Section 4.2.6.1.1. In addition, we used two attacks on Windows NT IIS
based on DDK and CodeRed attacks. DDK attack exploits the buffer overflow vulnerabil-
ity present in Windows IIS (MS01-033). CodeRed also exploits a similar vulnerability
(MS01-044) present in Windows IIS.
From our previous experiments, it is evident that the packets of length of 1460 are
best suited for polymorphic blending attacks. Therefore, we divided the attack into
multiple packets of length 1460. Attack vectors were placed at the location required
by the given attack. The decryptor was divided into several sections and allotted to
different attack packets. The sFSA corresponding to the artificial profile was adjusted
for the attack vector and the polymorphic decryptor.
Also, since substitution based attacks are better in matching normal profile, we
generated blending attacks using one-to-one byte substitution. For 1-gram PAYL,
PBAs were generated using the greedy algorithms presented in Section 4.2.3.2.1. For
2-gram PAYL, heuristics discussed in Section 4.2.4.2 were used to generate PBAs.
The attack body was divided into multiple fragments. A separate encryption key
for each attack body fragment was generated to match the adjusted artificial profile.
Each attack body fragment was encrypted using the corresponding key and appended
to the corresponding attack packet.
Finally each attack packet was padded to the desired packet length. We used the
greedy algorithms presented in Section 4.2.3.1 to generate a suitable padding. The
final attack packets were then used to launch an attack.
The polymorphic blending attacks were generated for the original PAYL 1-gram
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and 2-gram IDS. Since the number of training packets used to train the artificial
profile is small compared to one used to train the IDS, the artificial profile is not
accurate. Therefore, during the feature extraction, or support vector calculation in
SVM-classifier, or other feature manipulation, the extracted features or the support
vectors are significantly different than the ones generated for the IDS. Due to this
reason, PBAs generated using the improved IDS algorithm matches worse to the
IDS profile as compared to PBAs generated using the original PAYL. Therefore, we
present the results for PBAs generated using the original PAYL IDS. Also, the results
presented here are the average of results from 5 different hosts/LANs used for the
training of the artificial profile.
4.6.3.2 Improvements on PAYL
We use techniques discussed in Section 4.6.2 to improve the robustness of PAYL 1-
gram and 2-gram IDS. We used feature extraction to extract good features from the
original feature set. We also improved on the simple distance metric used by PAYL.
We also experimented with different randomization techniques to further improve on
the original PAYL.
4.6.3.2.1 Feature Extraction To remove noisy n-gram features used by PAYL,
we perform Karhunen-Loeve transform and chose the low variance direction. The
initial set of features used for the transformation consists of all the frequently occur-
ring n-grams along with one extra feature. The extra feature corresponds to all the
n-grams that are rare or absent in the training dataset. We calculated the correlation
matrix of the input features using the training dataset. Then we calculate the eigen-
vectors and the eigenvalues for the correlation matrix. Then we choose 0.2 fraction of
eigenvectors with the smallest eigenvalues as the new set of features and used them
for intrusion detection.
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4.6.3.2.2 Randomization We used four different randomization techniques to
make PAYL more robust. Each randomized method was repeated 10 times for vali-
dation purpose. The average of the 10 iterations is reported in the results.
• Basic Feature Selection: We randomly choose half of the original features
(that is 50% of the seen n-grams) and used them for detection.
• Transformed Feature Selection: We also performed random feature selec-
tion after Karhunen-Loeve transform. After finding the eigenvectors and eigen-
values of the correlation matrix, we removed very high-variance eigenvectors. Of
the remaining eigenvectors, we randomly choose half of the transformed features
and used them for detection.
• Feature Merging: We randomly merged n-grams to obtain a new feature set.
To merge a given subset of features into one feature, we performed Karhunen-
Loeve transform and chose the eigenvector with the smallest eigenvalue. All
the new features were generated by merging a fixed number of n-grams. The
n-grams to be merged were chosen using pseudo-random number generator.
• Randomized Data Sampling: The payload was divided into multiple sec-
tions and for every instantiation of IDS, a random sections was monitored.
4.6.4 Results
Improved IDSs along with original n-gram models were first tested using traditional
polymorphic attacks. All IDSs were able to detect all the traditional polymorphic
attacks. Next we generate polymorphic blending attacks to test the robustness of our
IDSs.
Figure 39 shows the size of the blending attack required to evade improved 1-gram
PAYL anomaly IDSs proposed in Section 4.6.3.2. Bigger attack size implies more









































































































































Figure 40: Polymorphic blending attack size for 2-gram PAYL
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attack instances were able to evade the IDS. As we decrease the false positive rate,
IDS increases the error threshold to avoid false positives and consequently it is easier
for an adversary to evade the IDS. Therefore, as we decrease the false positive rate,
smaller attack sizes are required to avoid detection.
IDS that uses feature extraction, transformed feature selection, and merging are
considerably more robust than the original PAYL. The 1-gram features used by PAYL
contains many noisy 1-gram and thus it does not perform very well. However, fea-
ture extraction, transformed feature selection, and merging, all three remove noisy
features and retain only the features that are more helpful in detection. Thus, these
three techniques considerably improve the robustness of the original PAYL. Random
data monitoring and basic feature selection are very basic techniques and moderately
improve the robustness of the IDS. Since both these techniques involve sampling, they
might discard potentially important features or data. Therefore, in some occasions,
both of these two techniques might reduce the robustness of the IDS.
Blending attack size required to evade improved 2-gram PAYL anomaly IDSs is
shown in Figure 40. An optimized and fine tuned original 2-gram PAYL is more effec-
tive than 1-gram model in the detection of polymorphic attacks. For 2-gram PAYL,
feature extraction, transformed feature selection, and feature merging improves the
robustness by using better features.
Since size of attack body and attack vector used by CodeRed is the largest of all
three attacks, it requires largest attack size to evade the IDS. On the other hand,
windows media services attack, with smallest attack code, requires smallest attack
size to escape detection.
The monitoring speed of each IDS was measured. The IDS was deployed on a
2.4Ghz Linux machine with 2GB RAM. Testing data was read from a tcpdump file
and time taken to classify the complete dataset was recorded. Table 4.6.4 shows the
monitoring speed of different IDSs. 1-gram monitoring takes considerably less time
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than 2-gram matching. This is due to the following two reasons. 2-gram feature is
more complex and takes more time to calculate. Also, the number of unique 2-gram
is much higher than number of unique 1-grams (Section 4.2.7).
Basic feature extraction and data sampling methods monitor a sub-sample of space
monitored by the original PAYL. Therefore, on an average they are faster than PAYL.
In feature merging, IDS merges n-grams using KLT. But the extra time for merging
is compensated by reduction in the number of features and also the overall speed
is faster. Feature extraction and transformed feature selection requires multiplying
eigenvector matrix to n-gram features. Hence, they take considerable time to monitor
the data.
Table 10: Monitoring speed (in secs/100K packets)
IDS Original Feature Basic Transformed Feature Data
Model Extraction Feature Feature Merging Sampling
Selection Selection
1-gram 6.33 13.70 4.75 12.67 4.63 6.21
2-gram 786.1 1225 500 1183.6 172 597.6
Considering both robustness and run time efficiency, randomization appears to be
the best robustness improvement strategy. Techniques like random feature merging
improves the robustness of an IDS and at the same time increases efficiency. Since
these randomization techniques sub-sample the monitoring space, there is a risk of
increased false negatives. Some of the other countermeasures make IDS very robust,
but they also consume more resources and are more complex in design and imple-
mentation. In short, trade-offs between robustness and other performance measures
need to be carefully considered before choosing a suitable IDS.
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4.7 Summary
Existing polymorphic techniques can be used to evade signature-based IDSs because
the attack instances do not share a consistent signature. But anomaly IDSs can de-
tect these attack instances because the polymorphism techniques fail to mask their
statistical anomalies. We presented a new class of polymorphic attacks called poly-
morphic blending attacks that overcomes this very shortcoming. The idea is to first
learn the normal profiles used by the IDS, and then, while creating a polymorphic
instance of an attack, make sure that its statistics match the normal profiles.
We described the basic steps and general techniques that can be used to devise
polymorphic blending attacks. We primarily use encryption and padding to modify
and generate a blended attack instance that matches the normal profile. We presented
a case study using the anomaly IDS PAYL to demonstrate that these attacks are
practical and feasible. Our experiments showed that polymorphic blending attacks
can evade PAYL while traditional polymorphic attacks cannot. We also showed that
an attacker does not need a large number of packets to learn the normal profile and
to blend in successfully.
We presented a formal framework for polymorphic blending attacks. We mod-
eled a variety of IDSs as either FSA or stochastic FSA. We also modeled different
polymorphic attack sections using FSA. We determined the complexity of generat-
ing different attack sections that match the (s)FSA IDS. Matching attack vector and
padding with an FSA IDS can be done in polynomial time using an algorithm sim-
ilar to Bellman-Ford algorithm. The problem of matching attack vector, padding,
or attack body with an sFSA IDS was proved to be NP-complete. We presented
some techniques to reduce these NP-complete problems to a satisfiability problem or
an integer linear programming problem. Thus, optimization algorithms available in
these problem domains can be used to generate near-optimal attack sections. We
also proposed a heuristic that can be used to find suitable attacks efficiently. We
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validated our framework using PAYL 1-gram and 2-gram. The polymorphic blending
attacks generated using optimization solvers and heuristics were closely able to match
the normal profile. They performed better than the greedy algorithms proposed in
the case-study.
We discussed the drawbacks of current anomaly IDSs due to which these poly-
morphic blending attacks exist. We also proposed techniques to improve the given
anomaly IDS so that it becomes harder to generate a blending attack. Using exper-
iments, we showed that the proposed techniques are indeed useful in improving the
robustness of anomaly detection systems. However, improving the robustness of an
anomaly IDS may also increase the computation complexity of the IDS. Thus the




In this dissertation, we focused on two important aspects of an IDS, namely, run-time
efficiency and robustness. The IDS should be efficient to be able to detect intrusions
in real-time. Also, the IDS should correctly classify normal activities as normal and
attack activities as attack, even in the presence of an adversary who is actively trying
to evade it.
To detect intrusions in real-time, the IDS should be fast and should require min-
imal memory. Since most of the resources in an IDS is typically consumed by the
approximate string matching component, an important problem to address is the
efficiency of approximate string matching algorithm.
We presented a fast algorithm for an approximate string matching problem, namely
q-gram matching, used by various host-anomaly IDSs and network anomaly IDSs. q-
gram matching is also used in other applications including, genome sequence match-
ing, misspelling detection, and pattern recognition. To contain false positives, the
training dataset of an anomaly IDS should be extensive. For huge text sizes, previous
string matching algorithms become unacceptable. Rabin-Karp algorithm works fast
for q-gram matching but requires large memory and produces false matches. The large
memory requirement of the Rabin-Karp method prohibits the IDS in being deployed
inside the kernel where it is suitable to perform system-call based detection.
We presented a tree-based algorithm to perform fast and memory efficient q-
gram matching. The text is pre-processed and stored in a tree. Tree pruning was
used to reduce the memory requirements and suffix links were added to make the
matching fast and efficient. Our experiments showed that the proposed algorithm is
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faster and more memory efficient than the previous algorithms. Compared to Rabin-
Karp algorithm, the space saving is by an order of magnitude. Space saving is more
apparent for high values of q. Since our model is very space efficient, it is suitable for
deployment in the kernel. This reduces the time required by the IDS to obtain the
monitored data and further improves the overall efficiency of the IDS.
Even though we improved the efficiency of q-gram matching used by various IDSs,
other factors may affect the performance of the IDS. Some of these factors are, data
acquisition time and latency, alert management, and alert reporting. These factors
need to be considered while designing an efficient IDS with real-time detection capa-
bilities. Also, our algorithm is applied to a particular approximate string matching
algorithm. As IDSs are evolving, they are using more complex detection models
and pattern matching approaches. For example, some IDSs use machine learning
techniques like SVM, genetic algorithms, and neural networks for pattern matching.
Different run-time optimization techniques and algorithms are required to make these
IDSs efficient.
Our algorithm can also be used to improve the efficiency of other applications that
use q-gram matching. An interesting future work is to apply our algorithm to other
applications and analyse the performance gains.
Ideally, we would like an IDS to detect all the attacks and make no mistakes.
However, an IDS typically generates both false positives and false negatives. False
negatives or undetected attacks can be particularly high if an adversary is actively
trying to evade the IDS. Thus, it is important to determine how robust an IDS is in
the face of such active attacks.
We proposed a novel attack called polymorphic blending attack to analyse the
robustness of network anomaly IDSs. To generate these attacks, we assume that the
adversary knows the IDS training and monitoring algorithm. The adversary first es-
timates the normal profile (or pattern) used by the IDS. Then the adversary modifies
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an initial attack instance so that the final attack instance matches the normal pro-
file. The initial attack instance is modified using different polymorphism techniques
including encryption and padding. Using an example IDS, we show that polymorphic
blending attacks are indeed feasible.
We presented a formal framework to analyse the complexity of polymorphic blend-
ing attacks. We showed that in general, it is NP-complete to generate a PBA that
optimally matches the normal profile. However, approximation algorithms proposed
in Section 4.4 can be used to generate an attack instance that closely matches the
normal profile and can easily evade IDSs.
Using polymorphic blending attacks, we successfully demonstrated that current
network anomaly IDSs are not robust against evading attacks. Based on the shortcom-
ings of current anomaly IDSs, we proposed some techniques to improve the robustness
of an IDS. Our experiments showed that these techniques are effective in improving
the robustness of IDSs.
Our framework considers IDSs that can be represented using (s)FSA. The frame-
work does not incorporate IDSs that use more expressive automatons. Also, modeling
of some attack sections, especially decryptor and attack body, is limited. We want
to extend our framework to include other IDSs. We would also like to include sim-
ple shellcode obfuscation techniques in our framework. Furthermore, we want to
include encryption techniques, other than one-to-one byte substitution and XOR, in
our framework.
Our proposed framework considers each attack sections separately. A separate
algorithm is presented to match each section with the (s)FSA IDS. Another possible
approach is to combine models for all the attack sections to create a single model
representing the attack packet. Then, the adversary can match the combined model
with the normal profile. Compared to the separate model approach, using a combined
attack model may generate better matching because, by using the combined attack
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model, the adversary can exploit the collective structure of different sections. But
matching the combined attack model is considerably more complex than matching
the sections separately. An interesting future work is to find an efficient algorithm to
match the combined attack model and the normal profile.
5.1 Discussion
The two issues, efficiency and robustness, discussed here are notably dependent on
each other. To a certain extent, these two parameters are somewhat conflicting in
nature. In Section 4.6, we observed that improving the robustness of an IDS requires
better features and consequently reduced efficiency, and vice versa, using simple sta-
tistical features for efficiency sacrifices robustness. It is not clear as to what the best
trade-off is.
It is hard to find the best compromise because the robustness of an IDS is not
easily quantifiable. Some of the criteria of robustness is the size of the attack, the
probability of successful evasion, and the amount of time and computing resources
used by the adversary. Many of these factors are not measurable. This makes it
harder to evaluate the effectiveness of an IDS improvement technique. Other factors,
like false positives, false negatives, and IDS management, complicate things further.
A unified framework to evaluate an IDS is highly desirable. The framework should
take all the important factors related to the IDS operation into consideration. The





Algorithm 1 q-gram matching using T
for all q-grams, Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1], i = 1 to |Q| − q + 1 do
Set current node as root of the tree T
for j = 0 to q − 1 do
if the current node does not have a child for character Q[i + j] then
reject the current substring Q[i, · · · , i+ q− 1] and match the next substring
starting from the root node
else
traverse to the child node for character Q[i + j]
end if
end for
if j = q − 1 and we reach a leaf node then




Algorithm 2 Tree Redundancy Pruning
for all the nodes Q[i, · · · , j] present in the tree T do
Compare subtrees rooted at node Q[i, · · · , j] and its immediate suffix node Q[i+
1, · · · , j]
if the two subtrees are similar then




Algorithm 3 q-gram matching using Tp
for all q-grams, Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1], i = 1 to |Q| − q + 1 do
Set current node as root of the tree T
for j = 0 to q − 1 do
if the current node is a leaf node then
mark the current substring Q[i, · · · , i + q − 1] as pending and match the
next substring starting from the root node
else if the current node does not have a child for character Q[i + j] then
for k = 0 to q − j − 1 do
if Q[i− k, · · · , i− k + q − 1] is marked pending then
mark Q[i− k, · · · , i− k + q − 1] as rejected
else





traverse to the child node for character Q[i + j]
end if
end for
if j = q − 1 and we reach a leaf node then
mark the current substring Q[i, · · · , i + q− 1] as accepted and match the next
substring starting from the root node
end if
end for
mark all the pending substrings as accepted
Algorithm 4 Adding suffix links in T
for all the nodes Q[i, · · · , j] present in the tree T do
create a suffix link from node Q[i, · · · , j] to its immediate suffix node Q[i +
1, · · · , j]
end for
135
Algorithm 5 q-gram matching using Ts
Set the current node as the root of tree Ts
for i = 1 to |Q| − q + 1 do
while the current node does not have a child for character Q[i] and we have not
reached the root node do
suppose the current node is at depth j
reject the current substring Q[i− j, · · · , i− j + q − 1]
traverse the suffix link and match character Q[i] for next substring
end while
if the current node is the root node and we still do not have a child for character
Q[i] then
character Q[i] is not in the tree, start matching with next character Q[i + 1]
end if
traverse to the child node for character Q[i]
if the current node is a leaf node then
accept the current substring (Q[i− q + 1, · · · , i])
traverse the suffix link
end if
end for
Algorithm 6 Adding suffix links in Tp
for all the nodes Q[i, · · · , j] present in the tree T do
for k = 1 to j − i do
if node Q[i + k, · · · , j] exists in Tp then
create a suffix link from node Q[i, · · · , j] to it longest suffix node Q[i +





Algorithm 7 q-gram matching using Tsp
Set current node as root of the tree Tsp
for i = 1 to |Q| − q + 1 do
while the current node does not have a child for character Q[i] or we have not
reached the root node do
/* A mismatch is found at current node for character Q[i] */
suppose the current node is at depth j
for k = 0 to q − j − 1 do
if substring Q[i − j − k, · · · , i − j − k + q − 1] is marked pending or is
unmarked then





traverse the suffix link
end while
if the current node is the root node and we still do not have a child for character
Q[i] then
character Q[i] is not in the tree, start matching with next character Q[i + 1]
end if
traverse to the child node for character Q[i]
if the current node is a leaf node then
if the current node is at depth q then
mark the current substring (Q[i− q + 1, · · · , i]) as accepted
else
mark the current substring (Q[i− q + 1, · · · , i]) as pending
end if
traverse the suffix link
end if
end for




B.1 Proof of Optimal Padding for 1-gram Blending Attack
We prove that the padding calculated using Equation (15) is minimum for matching
the 1-gram profile exactly.
Theorem B.1.1 λi ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ cn
Proof We prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume that for some j, λj < 0.
Then from Equation (15), ‖ŵ‖(δf(xj)− f̂(xj)) < 0. Thus, δ < f̂(xj)f(xj) . This contradicts
Equation (13), therefore, all λi ≥ 0.
The frequency of a character xi in the packet after padding is f́(xi) =
‖ŵ‖f̂(xi)+λi
‖ẃ‖ .
Using Equation (15) and Equation (12), f́(xi) = f(xi). Thus, the final attack packet
after padding has the exact target distribution, f(xi).
Theorem B.1.2 The padding calculated using Equation (15) is the minimum re-
quired padding to match frequencies exactly.
Proof Suppose we perform padding using Equation (15). Suppose there exists an-
other packet (say p, ‖p‖ < ‖ŵ‖) with smaller padding and matches the frequencies
exactly. Since λk = 0, the number of occurrences of xk in p cannot decrease. Thus,




‖p‖ > f(xk). Thus, packet p
does not match the normal frequencies exactly. Thus, we have reached a contradic-
tion.
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B.2 Proof of Hardness of 2-gram Single-Byte Encoding
First, we look at the problem of evading a simple IDS that stores all the 2-grams
present in the normal stream. While monitoring, it checks if all the 2-grams present
in the traffic are also present in the normal 2-gram list. In the event that the IDS finds
a 2-gram that was not present in normal traffic, IDS raises an alarm. Blending the
attack packet with the normal traffic requires the attacker to transform the packet
such that all the 2-grams in the packet after substitution are also present in the
normal 2-gram list. Matching the frequencies of the tuples is at least as hard as the
above simplified problem.
Suppose we have a normal traffic profile (N, TN) and an attack packet description
(M, TM), where N and M is the set of normal and attack characters, respectively.
TN and TM is the set of different 2-grams present in normal traffic and the attack,
respectively. Also, the attacker is allowed to do only one-to-one substitution from M
to N . Then, blending of the packet translates to finding a substitution S such that
all the tuples in S(w) are also present the normal profile. That is if a1a2 ∈ TM , then
S(a1a2) ∈ TN .
Theorem B.2.1 The problem of finding a one-to-one substitution S to match 2-
grams is NP-complete.
Proof To prove that the problem is in NP-complete, we need to show that the
problem is polynomial time verifiable and NP-hard.
Given a solution substitution S for the 2-gram matching problem, we can calculate
S(w) in O(‖w‖) steps. For each 2-gram present in S(w), checking if it is present
in TN can be done in O(‖w‖.TM) steps. Thus, this problem is poly-verifiable and
consequently in NP.
To show that the problem is NP-hard, we reduce the problem of sub-graph iso-










N = {a, b, c, d} M = {x, y, z}
T    = {xy, yx, yz, zy, zx, xz}T    = {ab, ba, bc, cb, cd, dc, da, ad}
M
Figure 41: Reducing sub-graph isomorphism to 2-gram matching problem
two graphs G(V, E) and G′(V ′, E ′), decide whether G′ is a sub-graph of G. Math-
ematically, we want to check if there is a mapping S(V ′ 7→ V ), s.t. ∀(v1, v2) ∈
E ′, (S(v1), S(v2)) ∈ E.
Suppose, N = V . For each edge e = (v1, v2) ∈ E, add two 2-grams (v1v2, v2v1) in
the normal profile (TN). Suppose M = V
′. For each edge e′ = (v1, v2) ∈ E ′, we add
two 2-grams (v1v2, v2v1) in the attack profile (TM).
If the above 2-gram matching problem has a solution, then we can find a mapping
S(V ′ 7→ V ) such that for all 2-grams (a1a2) ∈ TM , S(a1a2) ∈ TN . Since the 2-grams
in TM correspond to edges in G
′ and the 2-grams in TN correspond to edges in G,
the above statement suggests that ∀e′ ∈ G′, S(e′) ∈ G. This means that graph G′ is
isomorphic to a sub-graph of G with mapping given by S.
Also, if there does not exist a solution to the 2-gram matching problem, then there
does not exists a substitution St such that G
′ is a sub-graph of G after substitution.
Otherwise, St will result in a successful 2-gram mapping.
Thus, the 2-gram matching problem is at least as hard as the sub-graph isomor-
phism problem. It is known that the sub-graph isomorphism problem is NP-complete.
Also, we have already proved that the 2-gram matching problem is in NP. Thus, the
2-gram matching problem is NP-complete.
Even if an IDS allows constant number of mismatches, it can be shown that
the problem still remains NP-complete. This is followed by the result that sub-graph
140
isomorphism with constant number of edge insertion, deletion, and substitution is also
NP-complete. This means that an attacker cannot get the substitution that will match
the normal profile with a small constant number of mismatched 2-grams. Also, the
one-to-one substitution problem can be easily reduced to one-to-many substitution.
Thus, solving one-to-many substitution is also hard.
B.3 Pseudo-codes for PAYL blending
Algorithm 8 Substitution algorithm for 1-gram blending (cm ≤ cn)
sortdesc(f)
sortdesc(f́)
for i = 1 to cm do
S[yi] = {xi}
t̂f [i] = f [i]
end for
for i = cm + 1 to cn do
minRatio = infinity
for j = 1 to cm do
ratio = t̂f [j]
f́ [j]





t̂f [label] += f [i]
end for
for i = 1 to cn do
k = S−1[yi] = inverse map of xi





Algorithm 9 Substitution algorithm for 1-gram blending (cm > cn)
nv = number of vertices in the tree excluding root vertex
cap[i] = f [i]









for i = 1 to nv do
minDiff = infinity
for j = 1 to cn do
if minDiff > |cap[j]− wtn[i]| then
setLabel = true
for all sibling = children of parent[i] do




if setLabel == true then
minDiff = |cap[j]− wtn[i]|
label[i] = j







Algorithm 10 Pseudo-code for Hill Climbing Heuristic
curr key = generate random key()
curr dist = calculate distance(curr key)
best key = curr key
best dist = curr dist
for MAX times do
ki = get random key index()
min tmp dist = INF
for j in key range do
tmp key = curr key
set (ki = j) in tmp key
tmp dist = calculate distance(tmp key)
if tmp dist < min tmp dist then
min tmp dist = tmp dist
new key val = j
end if
end for
if min tmp dist < curr dist then
set (ki = new key val) in curr key
curr dist = min tmp dist
end if
if curr dist < min dist then
best key = curr key
best dist = curr dist
end if
if local maxima is reached then
for i = 1 to 5 do
k = get random key index()
v = get random key value()





B.5 Matching Attack Vector
Algorithm 11 Pseudo-code for Matching Attack Vector and FSA IDS
FSAav = Attack Vector FSA
AFSAids = Normal Profile FSA with error states and transitions
FSAint(Σ, Q, q0, δ, F ) = FSAav
⋂
AFSAids
for i = 0 to n do







for i = 1 to lav do
for edge (q1, q2, c) ∈ F do
alt = dist[q1][i− 1] + cost(q1, q2)
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